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“To Comply or Not To Comply?” An 
Argument in Favor of Increasing Investigation 







 The 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships and the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78) 
seek to protect the world’s oceans from environmental harms. Traditional 
maritime law, principles of international law, and difficulties in detecting 
violations of MARPOL 73/78 have made it difficult for nations to enforce 
the strict requirements regarding oil pollution under Annex I. In light of 
these difficulties, the United States authorities have used other means under 
United States law to prosecute these violations. This note argues that while 
the United States’ increased enforcement is controversial it is necessary in 
order to ensure that MARPOL 73/78 is effective and to protect the world’s 
oceans from environmental disaster. 
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When the words “oil,” “pollution,” and “ocean” are put together, an 
instant mental reaction is to think of the Deepwater Horizon events of 2010 
or the Exxon-Valdez event of 1989.1 Yet tremendous disasters such as these 
do not generate the majority of oil pollution in our world’s oceans today.2 
The vast majority of ocean oil pollution comes from discharges of oil and 
oily mixtures from shipping operations.3 Even though these discharges 
violate the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships and the Protocol of 1978 relating to the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ships (taken together, 
MARPOL),4 compliance with the provisions of the treaty is poor.5  
                                                                                                                           
 1. See Andrew Griffin, MARPOL 73/78 and Vessel Pollution: A Glass Half Full or 
Half Empty?, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 489, 489–90 (1994) (discussing the 
accessibility and newsworthy nature of large disasters such as Exxon Valdez compared to 
operational discharges). 
 2. See David P. Kehoe, United States v. Abrogar: Did the Third Circuit Miss the 
Boat?, 39 ENVTL L. 1, 3 (Winter 2009) (comparing the volume of oil from the Exxon Valdez 
spill with the annual volume of oil discharged from daily operations). 
 3. See id. (explaining the vast amount of oil dumped in the ocean is from operation of 
large vessels). 
 4. See International Conference on Marine Pollution: Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1319 [hereinafter MARPOL 73] (laying out 
operating requirements for shipping). 
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Over the past twenty years, the United States has increased 
enforcement of violations of MARPOL, as codified in the Act to Prevent 
Pollution from Ships (APPS).6 The United States has received criticism 
both for the practice of using whistleblowers as an investigatory tool and 
for aggressively prosecuting MARPOL violators.7 If oil pollution in the 
world’s oceans is to be eradicated, the United States must increase 
enforcement against the companies that own, operate, and have direct 
control over shipping and transportation in the oceans. 
This Note considers whether increased enforcement of MARPOL 
and APPS is effective and has been an effective tool in the attempt to 
eradicate or reduce oil pollution from our oceans. Part II addresses the 
history, background, and litigation surrounding MARPOL and the APPS in 
the United States. Part III asks whether a large whistleblower award is an 
effective tool, whether the United States is violating principles of 
international law, and which parties should prosecute MARPOL violations. 
The final part of this Note examines a number of different options regarding 
solutions to increase enforcement of MARPOL, and argues that an 
increased use of the whistleblower provisions, increased penalties for 
MARPOL violators, and mandatory whistleblower awards are necessary to 
further incentivize voluntary compliance and promote the goals of 
MARPOL. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 5. See MAR. TRANSP. COMM., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COST SAVINGS 
STEMMING FROM NON-COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS IN 
THE MARITIME SECTOR 4 (2003) [hereinafter COST SAVINGS] available at 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/transport/maritimetransport/2496757.pdf (noting that “compliance 
with international environmental rules still leaves something to be desired”) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 6. See Nicholas H. Berg, Note, Bringing It All Back Home: The Fifth and Second 
Circuits Allow Domestic Prosecutions for Oil Record Book Violations on Foreign-Flagged 
Vessels, 34 TUL. MAR. L.J. 253, 254 (2009) (explaining that the United States has increased 
MARPOL enforcement by focusing on the requirement that Oil Record Books are accurate); 
see also Michael G. Chalos & Wayne A. Parker, The Criminalization of Maritime Accidents 
and MARPOL Violations in the United States, 23 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 206, 209–10 (2010–11) 
(explaining that the United States has increased prosecutions of crewmembers, vessel 
owners, and managers). 
 7. See Berg, supra note 6, at 254–55 (explaining that clients are being warned 
globally of the potential increases in liability exposure); see also Chalos & Parker, supra 
note 6, at 209–10 (explaining that the United States pursues an aggressive prosecutorial style 
for deliberate violations of environmental laws and regulations). 
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II. Background 
A. History of the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships and the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
 
In the 1950s, the British government was concerned with ocean oil 
pollution because it had started to encroach on the British coast.8 In 1954, 
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution in the Sea by 
Oil (OILPOL 54)9 was drafted and implemented by the thirty-two countries 
responsible for the majority of merchant shipping tonnage in the world.10 
“[OILPOL 54] prohibited the discharge from any tanker of oil and oily 
mixtures of more than 100 parts per million, and established prohibition 
zones extending 50 miles from the shoreline in which intentional discharges 
were totally prohibited.”11 
In 1962 and 1969, OILPOL 54 underwent significant amendments 
due to poor enforcement and the lack of available technology required for 
compliance.12 The 1962 amendments enlarged the prohibition zones and 
prohibited any vessel that was 20,000 tons or greater from discharging oil 
or “oily mixtures.”13 Due to a lack of incentives for ship owners to use the 
available technology to separate oil from bilge water and use on-shore 
reception facilities, the 1962 amendments failed to effectively increase 
compliance.14 The 1969 amendments allowed ships to use a load-on-top 
procedure to separate oil from bilge water.15 Because the load-on-top 
                                                                                                                           
 8. See 2 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 209 (4th ed. 
2004) (discussing the United Kingdom’s response to oil pollution by calling a convention in 
1954). 
 9. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution in the Sea by Oil, May 
12, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, 327 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter OILPOL 54]. 
 10. See COLIN DE LA RUE & CHARLES B. ANDERSON, SHIPPING AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT: LAW AND PRACTICE 759 (1998) (explaining the history of the international 
treaties governing oil pollution). 
 11. Id. 
 12. See id. at 760–61 (explaining that a poor record of enforcement and lack of 
available technology led to a conference to amend OILPOL 54). 
 13. See Andrew Schulkin, Safe Harbors: Crafting an International Solution to Cruise 
Ship Pollution, 15 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 105, 111 (2002) (“Oily bilge water is oil-
contaminated water produced by a cruise ship’s engines, steam systems, evaporator dumps, 
and other components.”). 
 14. See DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 760 (discussing the shortfalls of 
the 1962 amendments to OILPOL 54 and the need for more amendments). 
 15. See Griffin, supra note 1, at 492 (describing load-on-top as “a procedure in which 
operational waters are allowed to settle during the voyage back to the loading port,” giving 
oil and water time to separate so the water can be siphoned off, after which new cargo can be 
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procedure was too difficult to use and implement, it also failed to 
significantly reduce oil pollution.16 
In 1973 an International Conference was held to bring OILPOL 54 
in line with modern tanker practices and operations.17 This conference 
produced the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships (MARPOL 73).18 MARPOL 73 was the first comprehensive regime 
that aimed to completely eradicate the intentional pollution of the oceans by 
oil and other harmful substances,19 including noxious liquid substances 
carried in bulk, harmful substances carried in package form, sewage, 
garbage, and air pollution.20  
In 1978 another convention was convened to address the high costs 
and mandatory requirements of MARPOL 73.21 The Protocol of 1978 
Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships (MARPOL 78)22 was adopted and allowed any state that ratified 
MARPOL 78 to automatically ratify MARPOL 73.23 MARPOL 78 included 
more stringent requirements for oil management and discharges during 
daily ship operations.24 
President Jimmy Carter signed MARPOL 73/78 in 1978, and the 
United States Senate ratified the treaty in 1980.25 MARPOL 73/78 is not a 
                                                                                                                           
“‘loaded on top’ of the oily slop”); see also DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 760 
(discussing the changes to OILPOL 54 required to promote compliance). 
 16. See DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 760–61 (discussing the difficulties 
that the 1969 amendments to OILPOL 54 faced); see also Griffin, supra note 1, at 492 (“The 
difficulty with LOT is that in order to be effective it requires a skilled and conscientious 
crew to follow the correct procedures. Also, since the separation process takes considerable 
time, LOT does not work well for short coastal voyages.”). 
 17. See id. (explaining the history of MARPOL 73). 
 18. See id. at 761–71 (summarizing the results of the 1973 Convention); see generally 
MARPOL 73, supra note 4 (laying out the agreement produced at the 1973 convention). 
 19. See id. at 760–61 (noting the importance of MARPOL 73 to international law). 
 20. See MARPOL 73, supra note 4, Annexes IIԟVI (governing these forms of 
pollution). 
 21. See DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 765–71 (discussing changes and 
additions to MARPOL 73). 
 22. See Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution from Ships, Feb. 17, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 546 [hereinafter MARPOL 78] (revising 
the regulations provided by MARPOL 73). 
 23. See id. art. I(2) (incorporating MARPOL 73 and MARPOL 78 into a single 
instrument); see also DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra, note 10, at 765 (discussing the 
process for adoption of MARPOL 78). 
 24. See DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 765–71 (noting some of the 
changes that MARPOL 78 made to MARPOL 73). 
 25. See 126 CONG. REC. 18, 492–93 (July 2, 1980) (voting to ratify MARPOL 78); 2 
THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 240 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing 
the United States legislative history with respect to MARPOL 78). 
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self-executing treaty26 and became part of United States law when the Act 
to Prevent Pollution from Ships (APPS) was enacted in 1980.27 The APPS 
repealed the United States implementing legislation for OILPOL 54.28 The 
treaty came into force in 1983 when, “twelve months after the date on 
which not less than fifteen states, the combined merchant fleets of which 
constitute not less than 50 per cent of the gross tonnage of the world’s 
merchant shipping, have become parties to it in accordance with Article 
IV.”29 MARPOL has been signed and ratified by 152 countries, 
representing ninety-nine percent of the world’s shipping tonnage.30 
 
B. Relevant Provisions of MARPOL 73/78 and the APPS 
 
The APPS applies to ships that operate under the authority of the 
United States, and with respect to Annexes I and II, any ship within the 
navigable waters of the United States.31 Under Annex I, the United States 
has jurisdiction to enforce all violations of MARPOL/APPS within the 
navigable waters of the United States.32 The navigable waters of the United 
States for APPS are defined as the territorial waters of the United States, 
reaching out to twelve nautical miles.33 The United States may prosecute 
any United States flagged ship for MARPOL violations.34 
                                                                                                                           
 26. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (“When the stipulations are 
not self-executing, they can only be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into 
effect, and such legislation is as much subject to modification and repeal by congress as 
legislation upon any other subject.”). 
 27. See Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C. § 1907(a) (2011) (declaring 
violations of MARPOL unlawful). 
 28. See DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 781 n.58 (stating that APPS 
repealed OILPOL 54 in the United States). 
 29. MARPOL 78, supra note 22, art. V. 
 30. See INT’L MAR. ORG., STATUS OF MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS 
IN RESPECT OF WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION OR ITS SECRETARY-
GENERAL PERFORMS DEPOSITARY OR OTHER FUNCTIONS 108-12 (2013) [hereinafter STATUS OF 
MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS], available at: 
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Documents/Status%20-
%202013.pdf (listing each nation that has signed and ratified MARPOL 78 and the number 
and percentage of nations that are a party to MARPOL 78) (on file with the WASHINGTON 
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 31. See 33 U.S.C. § 1902 (providing the jurisdictional requirements of the APPS). 
 32. See MARPOL 78, supra note 22 (providing each nation with the authority to 
prosecute MARPOL violations that occur within their own territorial waters). 
 33. See 33 U.S.C. § 1901(a)(7) (defining “navigable waters” as defined in Presidential 
Proclamation 5928 of December 27, 1988); Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Dec. 
27, 1988) (defining the territorial sea as extending out to twelve nautical miles). 
 34. See 33 U.S.C. § 1902(a)(1) (providing jurisdiction for prosecutions of all United 
States flagged ships “wherever located”). 
TO COMPLY OR NOT TO COMPLY? 257 
 
 
The Secretary of Defense is authorized to inspect the discharge of a 
harmful substance in violation of MARPOL by any ship that is at a port or 
terminal within United States control.35 Any prosecution for an illegal 
discharge by a foreign or United States flagged ship within the United 
States territory is subject to principles of comity, international law, and 
maritime law.36 
 
[I]f the violation is by a ship registered in or of the 
nationality of a country party to the MARPOL protocol . . . 
or one operated under the authority of a country party to 
the MARPOL protocol, . . . the Administrator . . . may refer 
the matter to the government of the country of the ship’s 
registry or nationality, or under whose authority the ship is 
operating for appropriate action.37 
 
Taken together, these provisions give the United States both discretionary 
enforcement powers and an obligation to abide by international law.  
A discharge must meet specific requirements to avoid violating 
MARPOL/APPS.38 An oil tanker may not discharge oil or oily mixtures 
within fifty nautical miles of the nearest land from a cargo bilge unless the 
discharge does not exceed fifteen ppm.39 In general discharges may not 
exceed fifteen ppm under MARPOL Regulations 12–16.40 
To combat the difficulty of monitoring discharges on the high seas, 
Regulation 20 requires maintenances of an Oil Record Book (ORB).41 The 
                                                                                                                           
 35. See § 1903 (providing the authority to promulgate regulations under APPS); 
§ 1904(c)(2) (subjecting such ships to inspection while under US jurisdiction). 
 36. See § 1912 (requiring any application of APPS to comply with international law); 
§ 1902(i) (including savings clause resolving inconsistencies with maritime or customary 
international law). 
 37. 33 U.S.C. § 1908(f) (emphasis added). 
 38. See MARPOL 73, supra note 4, Annex I, Regulation 15 (providing the specific 
discharge requirements of MARPOL); MARPOL 78, supra note 22, Annex I, Regulation 15 
(leaving unchanged the corresponding regulation from MARPOL 73); see also DE LA RUE & 
ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 760–63 (discussing MARPOL restrictions on vessel discharges 
in operation). 
 39. See MARPOL 73, supra note 4, Annex I, Regulation 34 (providing the specific 
discharge requirements of MARPOL); MARPOL 78, supra note 22, Annex I, Regulation 34 
(leaving unchanged the corresponding regulation from MARPOL 73). 
 40. See MARPOL 78, supra note 22, Annex I, Regulations 12–16 (prohibiting any 
discharge that exceeds fifteen parts per million); see also Michael G. Chalos & Wayne A. 
Parker, The Criminalization of Maritime Accidents and MARPOL Violations in the United 
States, 23 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 206, 212–13 (2010–11) (discussing oil discharge requirements 
under MARPOL, APPS, and United States regulations). 
 41. See MARPOL 78, supra note 4, Annex I, Regulations 17, 36 (requiring that all 
discharges by ships are accurately recorded in an ORB). 
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ORB must be maintained accurately and kept for three years.42 It must have 
a record of any discharge of oil or oily mixtures as permitted under 
Regulation 11 or any accidental or exceptional discharge of oil or oily 
mixtures that is not covered by a Regulation 11 exception.43 Failure to 
maintain an ORB is a violation of MARPOL.44 Under MARPOL and the 
APPS the failure to maintain an accurate ORB can lead to a criminal 
penalty.45 If the inspection and the investigation of the supposed discharge 
of harmful substances leads to a criminal penalty, up to one half of the fine 
may be awarded to the person who gave information that lead to the 
conviction.46 
 
C. Process of Enforcement 
 
While all investigations and violations have their own natures, the 
Fifth Circuit in United States v. Jho described how MARPOL 
investigations often occur.47 In Jho, the U.S. Coast Guard searched the M/T 
Pacific Ruby while the ship was in Port Neches, Texas.48 Based on a tip 
from one of the Pacific Ruby’s engineers, the Coast Guard investigated both 
an unlawful discharge of oil and the manipulation of pollution detection 
equipment by Chief Engineer Jho.49 
The Coast Guard has the statutory authority to: 
 
[M]ake inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, 
seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over 
                                                                                                                           
 42. See MARPOL 73, supra note 4, Annex I, Regulation 17 (specifying prompt 
recording and retention requirements); MARPOL 78, supra note 22, at Annex I, Regulation 
17 (adopting the corresponding regulation from MARPOL 73 with a technical amendment). 
 43. See MARPOL 73, supra note 4, Annex I, Regulation 17 (describing each type of 
discharge that must be recorded in the ORB); MARPOL 78, supra note 22, at Annex I, 
Regulation 17(adopting the corresponding regulation from MARPOL 73 with a technical 
amendment). 
 44. See MARPOL 73, supra note 4, Annex I, Regulation 17 (imposing the 
bookkeeping requirement); id. Art. 4 (deeming noncompliance a violation and providing for 
penalties); MARPOL 78, supra note 22, Art. I (incorporating the operative provisions of 
MARPOL 73). 
 45.  See Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C. § 1908(a) (2012) (making a 
knowing violation of MARPOL to be a class D felony).  
 46. See id. at § 1908(b)(2) (allowing a whistleblower to collect an award from the 
damages awarded against the MARPOL violator). 
 47. See generally United States v. Jho, 534 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that Jho 
could be held liable for failure to maintain an accurate ORB even though the discharge at 
issue did not occur in the United States’ navigable waters). 
 48. See id. at 400 (discussing the events that led to Jho’s prosecution). 
 49. See id. (discussing the Coast Guard’s reasons for investigating Jho and the M/T 
Pacific Ruby). 
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which the United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, 
detection, and suppression of violations of the laws of the 
United States. For such purposes, commissioned, warrant, 
and petty officers may at any time go on board of any 
vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or to the operation of any 
law, of the United States, address inquiries to those on 
board, examine the ship’s documents and papers, and 
examine, inspect, and search the vessel and use all 
necessary force to compel compliance.50 
 
The Coast Guard needs to show only a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity to survive a Fourth Amendment challenge for unwarranted search 
and seizure.51 
During the investigation the Coast Guard discussed the ORB 
entries with both Jho and the ship’s captain.52 Initially the Coast Guard 
determined that there was no violation; however, they later obtained 
corroborating evidence of MARPOL violations.53 The government 
eventually brought charges against Jho for eight counts of knowing failure 
to maintain an oil record book as required by 33 U.S.C. § 1908(a) and 33 
C.F.R. § 151.25.54 
If a ship is either liable for a fine or a civil liability or if there is 
reasonable cause to believe that a ship, its owner, operator, chief engineer, 
or someone in charge is subject to such liability, the Secretary of the 
Treasury, on request of the Secretary of Defense, may keep the ship in port 
by revoking the ship’s clearance to leave.55 In such cases, the ship is often 
retained in the port where the violation was found pending court 
proceedings.56 
                                                                                                                           
 50. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (emphasis added). 
 51. See United States v. Varlack Ventures, Inc., 149 F.3d 212, 216–17 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(discussing the requirements that the Coast Guard must fulfill in order to a search a vessel 
without a warrant). 
 52. See Jho, 534 F.3d at 400 (discussing the Coast Guard’s investigation of the M/T 
Pacific Ruby). 
 53. See id. at 400–01 (discussing the Coast Guard’s actions after the initial 
investigation). 
 54. See id. at 401 (describing the charges that were brought against Jho for his failure 
to properly maintain an accurate ORB). 
 55. See 46 U.S.C. § 60105 (2011) (requiring vessels to receive permission from the 
Secretary of Homeland Security before leaving a United States Port); see also 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1908(e) (2008) (allowing the Secretary of the Treasury to revoke the clearance required 
under 46 U.S.C. § 60105 for a ship to leave a United States port if under investigation or 
suspicion of a MARPOL violation). 
 56. See generally Giuseppe Bottiglieri Shipping Co. S.P.A. v. United States, 843 F. 
Supp. 2d 1241, 1244–45 (S.D. Ala. 2012) (discussing the retention of plaintiff’s vessel in 
port pending the proceedings for APPS violations and the failure of the Coast Guard to 
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When the Coast Guard receives information from a whistleblower, 
the court will provide the whistleblower with an attorney to represent the 
whistleblower’s interests in the proceeding against the violator.57 The 
whistleblower is sequestered from the rest of the ship’s crew at the expense 
of the ship-owner or lessor pending proceedings.58 
A whistleblower may recover up to one half of the award against 
the MARPOL violator in both civil and criminal proceedings.59 If the 
penalty imposed against the violator is a criminal penalty, then the 
whistleblower award is granted at the court’s discretion.60 If the penalty is a 
civil penalty, then the whistleblower award is granted at the discretion of 
the Secretary of Defense or the Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency depending on whether the Secretary or the 
Administrator has found that a party violated MARPOL.61 
If the whistleblower award arises out of a criminal prosecution and 
is a matter of the court’s discretion, then the whistleblower will be required 
to petition the court separately to receive the statutorily permitted award.62 
Whistleblowers will often be required to retain counsel to petition for their 
award.63 Moreover, mere judgment against a MARPOL violator does not 
guarantee that the whistleblower will receive any part of the penalty 
assessed.64 This places the whistleblower in a difficult position: The 
whistleblower has not worked since the proceeding began, has likely lost 
                                                                                                                           
negotiate for Giuseppe to have permission to leave); see also Benedict S. Gullo, The Illegal 
Discharge of Oil on the High Seas: The U.S. Coast Guard’s Ongoing Battle Against Vessel 
Polluters and a New Approach Towards Establishing Environmental Compliance, 209 MIL. 
L. REV. 122, 158 (discussing the procedures for investigations into APPS violations). 
 57. See United States v. Overseas Shipholding Grp., Inc., 625 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2010) 
(describing that when the grand jury proceedings against Overseas Shipholding Group had 
begun, the magistrate judge appointed an attorney to Barroso, the whistleblower, to represent 
Barroso’s interests in the proceedings against Overseas Shipholding Group). 
 58. See Chalos & Parker, supra note 6, at 234–35 (criticizing the Coast Guard’s 
aggressive use of 33 U.S.C. § 1908(e) to detain ships and 18 U.S.C. § 3144 authorizing the 
government to temporarily detain material witnesses at their employers expense). 
 59. See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1908(a)–(b) (2011) (allowing whistleblowers to recover 
at the discretion of the court, the Secretary of Defense, or the Administrator of the EPA up to 
one half of the award issued against the MARPOL violator). 
 60. See id. § 1908(a) (establishing that the court has discretion to provide the 
whistleblower with an award when the case is criminal). 
 61. See id. § 1908(b) (establishing that the Secretary of Defense or the Administrator 
of the EPA has discretion to grant a whistleblower award in civil cases). 
 62. See Overseas Shipholding Grp., Inc., 625 F.3d at 5 (discussing the potential 
difficulty that Barroso would face in securing his right to the whistleblower award). 
 63. See, e.g., id. (discussing Barroso’s retention of counsel). 
 64. See Anderson v. United States, 2012 WL 6087283, *5 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“Even if 
the Court had subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for violation of 
his due process rights. Plaintiff has not shown that he has a property right in the portion of 
the penalty that he seeks because the award is discretionary.”). 
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his or her job, and may find it difficult to attain new work in the maritime 
industry.65 Therefore, while a whistleblower may receive a windfall, a 
whistleblower also faces substantial risks.66 
 
D. Environmental Impact of Oil Bilge and Sewage Dumping in the World’s 
Oceans 
 
The issue of ocean oil pollution was largely ignored until OILPOL 
54 sixty years ago.67 The majority of ocean oil pollution is the result of 
daily operational ship discharges.68 Yet, public reaction and contempt for 
oil pollution is generally not voiced until major catastrophic events like the 
recent catastrophe in the Gulf of Mexico at the Macondo well.69 
Coast Guard Lieutenant Benedict Gullo noted the vastness of the 
oil pollution problem in our oceans: 
 
Each year up to 810,000 tons of oil waste are intentionally 
and illegally dumped into the world’s oceans by 
commercial vessels. As a consequence, seabird populations 
are reduced, the habitats for slow-moving shellfish such as 
clams, oysters, and mussels are poisoned, and fish—if not 
killed by harmful toxins of the oil—lose the ability to 
reproduce, reproduce deformed offspring, or upon 
ingestion of the oil create even more toxic substances.70 
 
Oil pollution harms the whole ocean environment, but is particularly 
harmful to seabirds.71 The oil from ship discharges damages the water 
                                                                                                                           
 65. See id. at *1 (discussing Anderson’s statements to United States authorities that he 
was putting his job at risk merely by talking to them); see also Overseas Shipholding Grp., 
Inc., 625 F.3d at 9 (arguing that the reason for the whistleblower award is to create 
incentives when there is a risk of retaliation from the whistleblower’s employer). 
 66. See Anderson, 2012 WL 6087283 at *5 (stating that Anderson does not have a 
right to the whistleblower award because it is merely discretionary, notwithstanding the risk 
to his job from reporting the violation). 
 67. See DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 760–62 (discussing the history and 
background of MARPOL 73/78). 
 68. See Gullo, supra note 56, at 210 (discussing the principal sources of ocean oil 
pollution); see also Kehoe, supra note 2, at 3 (comparing estimates of discharge-related 
ocean oil pollution to the Exxon-Valdez catastrophe from 1989). 
 69. See Andrew Griffin, MARPOL 73/78 and Vessel Pollution: A Glass Half Full or 
Empty?, 1 IND.J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 489, 489–90 (1994) (discussing the attention that 
large events like Exxon-Valdez receive by the public and legislatures unlike the more 
disastrous daily discharges when considered in their aggregate). 
 70. Gullo, supra note 56, at 122–23. 
 71. See Schulkin, supra note 13, at 112 (2002) (discussing all types of cruise ship 
pollution and the effect that these pollutants have on the marine environment). 
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repellent and body temperature maintenance properties of seabirds’ 
feathers, causing them to die from exhaustion or drowning.72 Oil ingested 
during preening also has a significant impact on their digestive and 
reproductive processes.73  
The primary cause of ocean oil pollution is from ships’ daily 
operational discharges in violation of MARPOL, rather than large 
accidental discharges.74 The Exxon-Valdez released 37,000 tons of oil into 
Prince William Sound off the coast of Alaska in 1989.75 The world 
witnessed the worst ocean oil spill in history in 2010 when an explosion 
occurred at the Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico.76 This spill should not 
be ignored as an extreme environmental catastrophe, nor should questions 
regarding the safety and procedures of deep-sea resource extraction be 
ignored. Nonetheless, the explosion and subsequent release of oil yielded 
only approximately 660,877 tons of oil.77 Therefore, the crux of the ocean 
oil pollution problem is from daily ship discharges in violation of 
MARPOL.  
 
E. How Have the Court’s Dealt with MARPOL/APPS Violations? 
 
1. United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.78 
 
United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. was one of the first 
cases that the Department of Justice and the Coast Guard vigorously 
                                                                                                                           
 72. See id. (discussing the effects of ocean oil pollution on birds ability to repel water 
and control body temperature) 
 73. See id. (discussing the effects of ocean oil pollution on birds’ digestive and 
reproductive systems). 
 74. See Kehoe, supra note 2, at 3 (critiquing the lack of attention paid to discharge 
based oil pollution compared with accident based oil pollution); see also Gullo, supra note 
56, at 124–25 (discussing the ongoing battle with the illegal discharge of oil on the high 
seas). 
 75. See Kehoe, supra note 2, at 3 (“Arguably the worst ecological disaster in U.S. 
history, the grounding of the Exxon Valdez oil tanker spilled approximately 37,000 tons of 
crude oil into Prince William Sound, Alaska on March 24, 1989.”). 
 76  See BP Leak the World’s Worst Accidental Oil Spill, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH 
(London), Aug. 3, 2010, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/7924009/BP-leak-the-
worlds-worst-accidental-oil-spill.html (discussing the blowout at the Macondo well in the 
Gulf of Mexico) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 77. See id. (stating that the spill at the Macondo well is estimated to have leaked more 
than four million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico). 
 78. See generally United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1358 
(S.D. Fla. 1998) (denying defendant Royal Caribbean’s motion to dismiss claims under the 
False Claims Act for providing an inaccurate ORB to the United States Coast Guard). 
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pursued for violations of MARPOL/APPS.79 In Royal Caribbean, the 
United States brought suit against Royal Caribbean cruise line for violating 
the False Claims Act,80 instead of bringing suit for MARPOL violations, 
because the MARPOL violation occurred outside of the United States 
territorial waters.81 Therefore, the United States did not have jurisdiction to 
prosecute the illegal discharge, but did have jurisdiction to prosecute 
violations of the False Claims Act for actions inside the United States’ 
territorial waters.82 
In February of 1993, the Coast Guard observed, via infrared 
technology, the discharge of oil from the Nordic Empress, one of Royal 
Caribbean’s many cruise ships.83 The discharge occurred in Bahamian 
sovereign waters.84 When the Nordic Empress entered the port of Miami, 
the Coast Guard investigated the illegal discharge and observed that the 
ORB did not indicate the illegal discharge observed by the Coast Guard.85 
Because the Nordic Empress sailed under the flag of Liberia, the 
United States referred the violation to Liberia pursuant to international law, 
practice, and MARPOL requirements.86 Liberia declined to prosecute 
because there was reasonable doubt that a MARPOL violation occurred.87 
After Liberia failed to prosecute Royal Caribbean for violating MARPOL, 
the United States brought suit under the False Claims Act for presenting to 
the United States Coast Guard a false ORB.88 
Royal Caribbean argued that the United States does not have 
jurisdiction to prosecute the illegal discharge in this case under MARPOL 
because it occurred outside the United States’ territorial waters.89 Therefore, 
                                                                                                                           
 79. See William A. Goldberg, Case Note, Cruise Ships, Pollution, and International 
Law: The United States Takes on Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, 19 WIS. INT’L L.J. 71, 71–
72 (2000–01) (discussing the Department of Justice’s novel arguments to find Royal 
Caribbean liable and avoid violating international law). 
 80. See False Claims Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2011) (imposing fines and 
imprisonment for knowing and willful falsification or concealment of a material fact, false 
representation, or false writing in a matter involving a federal entity). 
 81. See Royal Caribbean Cruises, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1367 (noting that while 
jurisdiction for the MARPOL violation belonged to the flag state, Liberia, the government 
had instead brought an FCA claim for the misleading ORB, over which the US did have 
jurisdiction notwithstanding MARPOL). 
 82. See id. at 1368 (“To the extent that the presentation of the materially false Oil 
Record Book to the Coast Guard constitutes a separate, actionable crime under United States 
law, MARPOL does not bar that prosecution.”) 
 83. See id. at 1361 (reciting the facts of the case). 
 84. See id. (reciting the facts of the case). 
 85. See id. (reciting the facts of the case). 
 86. See id. (reciting the facts of the case). 
 87. See id. at 1361–62 (reciting the facts of the case). 
 88. See id. at 1362 (reciting the history of the indictment). 
 89. See id. (reciting the defendant’s motion to dismiss arguments). 
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any prosecution would violate the terms of MARPOL, traditional maritime 
law, and principles of international law.90 The government argued that 
Royal Caribbean was not prosecuted for the illegal discharge in the 
Bahamas, but for presenting a false ORB to the Coast Guard in a United 
States port. The court agreed.91 Presenting the false ORB to the Coast 
Guard is illegal under the False Claims Act, and the United States has 
jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed within its territorial 
boundaries.92 
The court found that the United States had jurisdiction over Royal 
Caribbean for violations of the False Claim Act and that the prosecution did 
not violate principles of international law.93 The court noted that “even if 
the statement is arguably true at the time it was made in the location in 
which it was made, if the statement is false as a matter of United States law 
and fulfills the other requirements for § 1001 claim, it is actionable.”94 The 
court then determined that if the government could substantiate the prima 
facie elements of the False Claims Act claim, Royal Caribbean’s statements 
could be actionable under the Act for providing an ORB that did not 
include the illegal discharge observed in the Bahamas by the Coast Guard.95 
 
2. United States v. Petraia Maritime, Ltd.96 
 
In 2007 the District Court for the District of Maine held that the 
court lacked jurisdiction to prosecute MARPOL violations by foreign-
flagged ships that do not occur within the United States’ territorial waters.97 
The court held, however, that it does not lack jurisdiction to prosecute 
violations of ORB maintenance requirements by foreign-flagged ships 
when that ship is in the United States’ territorial waters.98 The court has the 
power to adjudicate any MARPOL violation that occurs within the territory 
                                                                                                                           
 90. See id. (reciting the defendant’s motion to dismiss arguments). 
 91. See id. at 1368 (“The discharge of oil in an improper manner is one crime; the 
failure to keep an Oil Record Book as required under MARPOL/APPS is another; and the 
deliberate presentation of a false material writing to the U.S. Coast Guard is another.”) 
 92. See id. at 1368–69 (determining that MARPOL does not preclude an FCA claim). 
 93. See id. (determining that MARPOL does not preclude an FCA claim). 
 94. Id. at 1363–64 (citing United States v. Godinez, 922 F.2d 752 (11th Cir. 1991)). 
 95. See id. (“If the [ORB] documents are [routinely used by federal officials], and the 
prima facie requirements of the five elements of a § 1001 claim are met . . . then the 
statement is action-able under § 1001.”). 
 96. United States v. Petraia Maritime, Ltd., 483 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D. Me. 2007). 
 97. See id. at 38–39 (determining that, on these facts, the reasoning in Royal 
Caribbean precluded the federal government from jurisdiction over the MARPOL 
violation). 
 98. See id. (determining that Royal Caribbean did, however, afford the government 
jurisdiction for the separate offense concerning the ORB violation). 
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of the United States, including ORB maintenance violations, even if the 
discharge at issue in the ORB did not occur within the United States 
territorial waters.99 
In Petraia, the ship M/V Kent Navigator sailed under the flag of 
Gibraltar and was owned by a Swedish company incorporated in the British 
Virgin Islands.100 Petraia argued that the case should be dismissed because 
the United States lacked jurisdiction to prosecute under MARPOL because  
 
the alleged inaccuracies in the vessel’s oil record book 
involve a discharge on the high seas outside the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States, the actions constituting 
the crimes alleged in the indictment occurred outside the 
jurisdiction of the United States, which may not bring such 
charges under MARPOL and [the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea].101 
 
The court disagreed.102 Citing Royal Caribbean, the court 
concluded that the criminal violation Petraia was charged with was not for 
the illegal discharge of oil on the high seas under MARPOL, but for failure 
to maintain an accurate ORB while in the United States territorial waters.103 
By failing to maintain an accurate oil record book while in U.S. territorial 
waters, Petraia violated MARPOL/APPS—which requires specifically 
recording all legal and illegal discharges—giving the United States the 
authority to prosecute violations.104 Therefore, jurisdiction in the District 
Court of Maine was deemed proper.105 The court then specifically noted, 
 
to find to the contrary would raise serious questions about 
the government’s ability to enforce, as a matter of domestic 
law, false statements made in connection with such matters 
as bank fraud, immigration, and visa cases, where the false 
statements at issue were made outside of the United States, 
                                                                                                                           
 99. See id. (discussing the jurisdictional status of the various violations). 
 100. See id. at 36 (stating that the ship was registered with the government of Gibraltar, 
owned by a corporation located in Sweden, and incorporated under the laws of the British 
Virgin Islands). 
 101. Id. at 36–37. 
 102. See id. at 38 (relying on the reasoning in Royal Caribbean to reject defendant’s 
argument). 
 103. See id. (discussing the reasoning of the court in Royal Caribbean). 
 104. See id. at 38–39 (“[T]he concurrent jurisdiction provision of MARPOL allowed 
the United States to prosecute what was clearly a crime in and of itself: the presentation of a 
false Oil Record Book to the Coast Guard.”). 
 105. See id. (determining that the facts were not sufficiently distinct from Royal 
Caribbean to justify foreclosing jurisdiction). 
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perhaps acceptable or in the alternative unnecessary under 
the appropriate foreign regulatory scheme, but nonetheless 
illegal under United States law.106 
 
3. United States v. Jho; United States v. Ionia Management; United States 
v. Pena 
 
Since Petraia the Fifth, Second, and Eleventh U.S. Circuit Courts 
of Appeal have held that jurisdiction is proper for prosecutions of ORB 
violations when the ship was in a United States port.107 In Jho, the 
defendants argued the United States could prosecute only ORB violations 
that had actually occurred within the United States under 
MARPOL/APPS.108 The Fifth Circuit summarily rejected this argument, 
focusing on the purpose and intent of MARPOL/APPS, to prevent oil 
pollution at sea.109 The court stated: 
 
Accurate oil record books are necessary to carry out the 
goals of MARPOL and the APPS. If the record books did 
not have to be “maintained” while in the ports or navigable 
waters of the United States, then a foreign-flagged vessel 
could avoid application of the record book requirements 
simply by falsifying all of its record book information just 
before entry into a port or navigable waters.110 
 
If ship owners’ arguments were accepted, then the goal of 
preventing ocean oil pollution would be undermined.111 Based on the Fifth 
Circuits holding in Jho, ship owners, charters, and chief engineers have an 
                                                                                                                           
 106. Id. at 38 (quoting United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 11 F. Supp. 2d 
1358, 1364 (S.D. Fla. 1998)). 
 107. See United States v. Jho, 534 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that under APPS 
there is a duty to keep accurate ORB, violation of which could be prosecuted); United States 
v. Ionia Mgmt., 555 F.3d 303 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding the same); United States v. Pena, 684 
F.3d 1137 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding the same). 
 108. See Jho, 534 F.3d at 402–03 (discussing the defendant’s claim that because the 
alleged misconduct was made in international waters, it was outside U.S. ports or navigable 
waters). 
 109. See id. at 403 (“[I]gnoring the duty to maintain puts the regulation at odds with 
MARPOL and Congress’ clear intent under the APPS to prevent pollution at sea according 
to MARPOL.”). 
 110. Id. 
 111. See id. (“We refuse to conclude that by imposing limitations on the APPS’s 
application to foreign-flagged vessels Congress intended so obviously to frustrate the 
government’s ability to enforce MARPOL’s requirements.”). 
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affirmative duty to keep a properly maintained ORB at all times in United 
States territorial waters.112 
The defendants in Jho also argued that jurisdiction was improper 
because it violated principles of customary international law and the United 
Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS).113 The defendants 
argued that the United States did not have jurisdiction to prosecute the 
violations alleged because the ship in question, the M/T Pacific Ruby, was 
registered in Liberia, and under the law of the flag, only Liberia had 
jurisdiction to prosecute MARPOL violations by the defendants.114 
The court rejected these arguments, asserting that the law of the 
flag doctrine cannot be used as a shield from the jurisdiction of United 
States courts.115 The court stated that, “it has long been established that a 
state has the power to prosecute violations of its laws committed by 
foreign-flagged vessels in its ports as long as the port state has not 
abdicated authority to do so.”116 Because the prosecutions in Jho were for 
violations of United States law, the violation of the ORB maintenance 
requirements occurred within the United States territorial waters, and the 
United States had not abdicated its sovereignty, the United States had 
authority to prosecute Jho for failing to properly maintain the ORB.117 
In Ionia Management,118 the Second Circuit addressed similar 
questions for the first time.119 Ionia Management, a company incorporated 
in Liberia and headquartered in Greece, owned the 600-foot oil tanker 
named the M/T Kriton.120 The ship made numerous deliveries of oil to ports 
along the eastern seaboard of the United States.121 During this period, its 
chief engineers routinely discharged oily waste directly into the ocean by 
diverting the waste around the oily water separator, none of which were 
recorded in the Kriton’s oil record book.122 The Department of Justice 
                                                                                                                           
 112. See id. (“[W]e read the requirement that an oil record book be ‘maintained’ as 
imposing a duty upon a foreign-flagged vessel to ensure that its oil record book is accurate 
(or at least not knowingly inaccurate) upon entering the ports of navigable waters of the 
United States.”). 
 113. See id. at 405–06 (discussing this body of law). 
 114. See id. (discussing the defendants’ arguments). 
 115. See id. at 406 (“The Supreme Court has recognized that the law of the flag 
doctrine does not completely trump a sovereign’s territorial jurisdiction to prosecute 
violations of its laws.”). 
 116. Id. at 408–09. 
 117. See Jho, 534 F.3d at 409–10 (rejecting the idea that 33 U.S.C. § 1912 prevents 
prosecution of the oil record book offenses charged against Jho). 
 118. United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 555 F.3d 303 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 119. See id. at 303 (holding that a duty existed under APPS to keep accurate ORB, 
violation of which could be prosecuted). 
 120. See id. (reciting the facts of the case). 
 121. See id. (reciting the facts of the case). 
 122. See id. (reciting the facts of the case). 
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indicted Ionia for thirteen counts of violations of APPS, one count of 
conspiracy, three counts of falsifying records in a federal investigation, and 
one count of obstruction of justice.123 
While the circumstances of the investigation are not divulged in the 
Second Circuit’s opinion, the court adopted the analysis of the Fifth Circuit 
in Jho, finding that the district court had jurisdiction for the indictments that 
were issued under MARPOL/APPS.124 Quoting Jho, the court noted that 
 
[the] Supreme Court has recognized that the law of the flag 
doctrine does not completely trump a sovereign’s territorial 
jurisdiction to prosecute violations of its laws: The law of 
the flag doctrine is chiefly applicable to ships on the high 
seas, where there is no territorial sovereign; and as respects 
ships in foreign territorial waters it has little application 
beyond what is affirmatively or tacitly permitted by the 
local sovereign.125 
 
In the most recent case to address United States enforcement of 
MARPOL, United States v. Pena,126 the Eleventh Circuit continued the 
trend of upholding jurisdiction for prosecutions of MARPOL violations in 
United States courts.127 
In Pena, the defendant did not violate the ORB maintenance 
requirement; however, Pena did violate MARPOL certification 
requirements.128 While Pena does not involve a failure to properly maintain 
an accurate ORB or an illegal discharge, the analysis of the court is 
important and displays the reach of the holdings in Royal Caribbean, 
Petraia, Jho, and Ionia Management.129 
                                                                                                                           
 123. See id. at 306 (reciting the basis for the indictments). 
 124. See id. at 308 (“[T]he court [in Jho] found that the ORB offenses were charged ‘in 
accordance with’ the law of the flag . . . . We agree for substantially the reasons stated by the 
Fifth Circuit.”). 
 125. Id. (citing United States v. Jho, 534 F.3d 398, 406 (5th Cir. 2008)). 
 126. United States v. Pena, 684 F.3d 1137 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 127. See id. at 1141–42 (“[W]e hold that the United States has jurisdiction to prosecute 
surveyors for MARPOL violations committed in U.S. ports.”). 
 128. See id. at 1143–44 (reciting the facts of the case). 
 129. See United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1364 
(S.D. Fla. 1998) (holding that whether the United States has the authority to regulate 
potentially illegal discharges or failure to properly update an ORB outside of United States 
jurisdiction does not affect the United States Coast Guard’s ability to regulate maintenance 
of an ORB inside U.S. waters); United States v. Petraia Maritime, Ltd., 483 F. Supp. 2d 34, 
38 (D. Me. 2007) (citing and agreeing with the holding from Royal Caribbean); Jho, 534 F. 
3d at 404 (affirming that the gravamen of the action is not the illegal discharge but the 
misrepresentation to the United States government); Ionia Mgmt., 555 F.3d at 309 (joining 
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Hugo Pena was employed by the Universal Shipping Bureau as a 
ship inspector and conducted ship inspections necessary to receive a 
certification that the ship complied with MARPOL requirements.130 The 
Island Express I changed its flag from St. Kitts and Nevis to Panama.131 In 
order to comply with all necessary regulations it was required to have a new 
IOPP certificate issued. The IOPP certificate is a certification under 
MARPOL that indicates that a certified ship complies with the MARPOL 
requirements for proper disposal of bilge water and other oily mixtures.132 
Pena conducted the survey of the Island Express I and issued the 
certification even though he was aware that the oily water separator was not 
operational, and that the Island Express I’s engineer had fashioned a means 
to pump the bilge water from the engine room directly to the ship’s deck.133 
This system rendered the Island Express I ineligible for certification.134  
Pena sought to dismiss the suit because he was issuing 
certifications for Panama and not the United States.135 He argued that any 
suit against him in the United States would offend notions of extra-
territorial enforcement of the law.136 The Eleventh Circuit was not 
persuaded, and concluded that because Pena was operating out of Miami, 
Florida, and the certification was issued while the Island Express I was in 
United States territorial waters, that the United States had adequate 
jurisdiction to prosecute this particular violation of MARPOL.137 Pena’s 
other arguments—that the indictment failed to allege he had a duty to 
conduct a complete MARPOL survey, and that failure to conduct a survey 





                                                                                                                           
the Fifth Circuit and holding that the APPS imposes a duty on ships to have an accurately 
maintained ORB when entering a U.S. port). 
 130. See Pena, 684 F.3d at 1143–44 (discussing the factual and procedural history). 
 131. See id. at 1143 (reciting the facts of the case). 
 132. See id. at 1142–43 (noting that the certificate is issued upon successful completion 
of an inspection by the flag state, either on its own or through a designated “surveyor”). 
 133. See id. at 1143–44 (reciting the facts of the case). 
 134. See id. at 1142 (discussing the MARPOL requirements concerning bilge water 
discharge). 
 135. See id. at 1145 (discussing Pena’s jurisdictional argument). 
 136. See id. (discussing Pena’s jurisdictional argument). 
 137. See id. at 1145–46 (noting that a port state’s jurisdiction over matters occurring in 
port is settled law and that MARPOL provides the flag state with mere concurrent 
jurisdiction over such matters). 
 138. See id. at 1147–48 (discussing and rejecting these arguments). 
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III. Discussion 
 
A. Use of the Whistleblower Provision of the APP as a Tool in Enforcing 
MARPOL 73/78 
 
The recent growth in enforcement proceedings under MARPOL 
and APPS is partially attributable to the 1987 amendment to the APPS.139 
The 1987 Amendment provided that a whistleblower may be able to receive 
up to one half of the damages awarded in a successful prosecution for 
MARPOL/APPS violations.140 Over the past ten years the United States 
Department of Justice has significantly increased its use of this provision 
and subsequently increased the number of prosecutions for MARPOL 
violations.141 In 2010, for example, the number of vessel pollution case 
referrals was double the ten-year annual average.142  
This rise in prosecution and general enforcement has created a 
sense of unease in the maritime shipping community.143 As the law firm 
Chalos & Co.144 contends, there is a concern that many of these 
whistleblowers are acting only out of spite for their employers or out of 
                                                                                                                           
 139. See Jeanne M. Grasso & Gregory F. Linsin, Blank Rome LLP, MARPOL 
Enforcement in the United States, MARITIME PROFESSIONAL 8, 8–11 (May 2011), available at 
http://www.blankrome.com/index.cfm?contentID=37&itemID=2471 (discussing the United 
States enforcing compliance with the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships); see also Chalos & Co. P.C., U.S. Prosecution of Suspected MARPOL 
Violations—Whistleblowers: Are they Really Reliable?, CHALOS & CO. P.C. (2011) 
[hereinafter Chalos 2011], http://www.chaloslaw.com/us-prosecution-marpol-violations.html 
(discussing the United States government’s prosecution of suspected MARPOL violations) 
(on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
 140. See Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C. § 1908 (2008) (“A person who 
knowingly violates the MARPOL Protocol, Annex IV to the Antarctic Protocol, this chapter, 
or the regulations issued thereunder commits a class D felony. . . . [A]n amount equal to not 
more than ½ of such fine may be paid to the person giving information leading to 
conviction.”). 
 141. See Grasso & Linsin, supra note 139, at 8 (discussing the United States’ 
aggressive enforcement efforts since the early 1990s); see also Brandon L. Garrett, 
Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1826 (Dec. 2011) (“Federal 
prosecutors have increasingly prosecuted pollution on the high seas and not in U.S. 
navigable waters.”). 
 142. See Gullo, supra note 56, at 125 (discussing increased prosecution efforts). 
 143. See Grasso & Liskin, supra note 139, at 9 (discussing the preventative measures 
taken by vessel owners to foster increased compliance as a result of the increased pace of 
enforcement). 
 144. Chalos & Co. is an international law firm that specializes in maritime law, with a 
special practice area devoted to MARPOL violation defense. See CHALOS & CO. P.C., 
MARITIME & MARPOL CRIMINAL DEFENSE, http://www.chaloslaw.com/maritime-criminal-
defense.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2013) (discussing the firm’s practice). 
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personal greed.145 Chalos & Co. cites an incident from Corpus Christi, 
Texas in which a whistleblower claimed that his vessel, the M/T Wilmina, 
violated MARPOL.146 Upon receiving the tip, the Coast Guard detained the 
ship pending further investigation.147 This investigation did not result in 
charges under APPS or MARPOL.148 The detention of a ship and 
subsequent investigation significantly impacts both the company and crew 
from loss of revenues and daily pay.149 
While Chalos & Co. presents a valid argument, they ignore the 
necessity and importance of awarding whistleblowers. These awards are 
particularly useful when it is difficult to detect violations of laws and 
relevant treaties.150 Ocean pollution laws are perfectly suited for these 
additional detection and enforcement measures.151 It would be an onerous 
and prohibitively expensive task for the United States and every major 
shipping country to have a fleet of ships dedicated solely to policing the 
oceans for MARPOL violations.152 By employing a regulatory scheme that 
relies on whistleblowers instead of a large enforcement apparatus, the 
United States is able to enforce MARPOL more efficiently because it is 
                                                                                                                           
 145. See Chalos 2011, supra note 139 (“[W]histleblowers have been said to be 
motivated to use the U.S. whistleblower program for self-serving purposes of revenge and 
exacting large monetary rewards.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 146. See id. (discussing a 2010 dispute between a whistleblower and a foreign-flagged 
oil tanker, after the whistleblower reported a MARPOL violation). 
 147. See id. (discussing the initial investigation for MARPOL violations). 
 148. Awilco AS, Press Release May 28, 2010, “USCG Allegation Concerning 
Violation Of Marpol Regulation By M/T Wilmina,” http://www.ship.gr/news6/awilco1.htm 
(stating that the Coast Guard dropped charges against the ship, the crew, and the owner after 
detaining the ship for twenty days) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 149. See Ho-Sam Bang, Recommendations for Policies on Port State Control and Port 
State Jurisdiction, 44 J. MAR. L. & COM. 115, 118–19 (Jan. 2013) (“Almost every vessel at 
sea has tight schedules which are arranged by ship owners or charterers. Ship detention in a 
port causes the owner or charterer of the vessel to lose money.”). 
 150. See Stefan Rutzel, Snitching for the Common Good: In Search of a Response to 
the Legal Problems Posed by Environmental Whistleblowing, 14 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 
1, 34 (1995) (reasoning that whistle-blowers provide a necessary incentive to private 
organizations, which tend to correct wrongdoing with minimal efforts and are reluctant to 
investigate other environmental damage). 
 151. See id. at 35, 43 (examining the “legitimate reasons” to maintain silence about the 
illegal acts of others and why mandating whistleblowing will incentivize employees to come 
forward, particularly in the area of pollution and environmental misconduct); see also Gullo, 
supra note 56, at 134 (discussing the ways in which vessel polluters avoid detection). 
 152. See Rutzel, supra note 150, at 46 (discussing the expensive approach of having the 
government investigate and prosecute each violation); see also Gullo, supra note 56, at n. 
100 (explaining the Coast Guard’s ability to detect oil spills and the costs associated with 
detection). 
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more economically viable.153 Therefore, in order to efficiently enforce 
MARPOL oil pollution requirements, enforcement authorities must rely on 
crewmembers that are willing to testify to the proper authorities, whether in 
the United States or other MARPOL nations.154 Moreover, without this 
information, the proper authorities would be hard pressed to have the 
reasonable belief necessary to justify an in-depth examination and 
investigation of a ship’s practices.155 
Chalos & Co. is also concerned that whistleblower awards are too 
large and therefore over incentivize crewmembers reporting violations to 
the authorities, particularly those in the United States.156 The United States 
prosecutions and settlement awards tend to be consistently greater than 
those awarded by other MARPOL signatories; and because the United 
States has high punitive damage awards, the possible reward for a 
whistleblower is significant.157 The significance of a multi-million dollar 
award is great when compared to the average ship crewmember salary of 
$12,000 per year.158 Additionally, there are indications that whistleblowers 
may hold information until their ship reaches the United States or a United 
States port abroad, so as to be eligible for generous awards under United 
States law.159 
Grasso and Linsin recognize, however, that because the risks that 
companies and ship owners take for violating provisions of MARPOL when 
they enter U.S. ports around the world has increased, there is a trend of 
                                                                                                                           
 153. See Rutzel, supra note 150, at 35 (“[E]xternal whistleblowing helps to update 
environmental data and to make government aware of problems in compliance, leading to 
more efficient future regulation and a better determination of the crucial control issues.”); 
see also Gullo, supra note 56, at 155 (“To some individuals involved with the maritime 
industry and legal counsel representing the interests of vessel owners and operators, whistle-
blowers are considered ‘one of the U.S. [G]overnment’s biggest weapons’ in vessel pollution 
prosecutions.”). 
 154. See Gullo, supra note 56, at 155 (explaining the vital role that whistle-blowers 
play in MARPOL prosecutions). 
 155. See Rutzel, supra note 150, at 36 (explaining that actual violations are often 
detected after a reported suspicion, even a false one, leads to an investigation).  
 156. See Chalos 2011, supra note 139 (arguing that the credibility of whistleblowers 
should be questioned due to the lucrative rewards available to them, thus potentially over-
incentivizing them); see also Grasso, supra note 139, at 8 (reporting that more than fifty-
percent of new cases stem from whistle-blowers, most likely because of the lucrative 
rewards).  
 157. See COST SAVINGS, supra note 5, at 49 (comparing MARPOL fines between 
several countries). 
 158. Compare Gullo, supra note 56, at 143–44 (discussing low crewmember wages) 
with U.S. v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 555 F.3d 303, 311 (providing an award of $4.9 million 
against the ship owner for MARPOL violations). 
 159. See Grasso & Linsin, supra note 139, at 10 (discussing whistleblowers collecting 
evidence to document the violation and waiting until they arrive back in the United states to 
disclose the information). 
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increased MARPOL compliance.160 For example, some companies have 
adopted open reporting systems.161 In an open reporting system, a ship 
owner provides hotlines or anonymous electronic reporting for 
crewmembers that witness MARPOL violations.162 In some instances the 
ship owner will provide an internal monetary award for reports of 
MARPOL violations.163 
Although the maritime industry is responding to United States 
enforcement measures and is beginning to adopt policies to abide by 
MARPOL and curb oil pollution (or any pollution of the ocean),164 
enforcement by MARPOL nation authorities is necessary. Without 
enforcement by the Coast Guard and the Department of Justice (and the 
corresponding authorities in other MARPOL signatories), internal 
procedures to comply with MARPOL more efficiently would not have been 
adopted.165 Because compliance remains far from universal, enforcement 
must increase both within the U.S and abroad.166 
 
B. Effect of Department of Justice Enforcement of ORB violations on 
Principles of International and Maritime Law 
 
In many MARPOL enforcement cases, defendants argue that 
enforcement of MARPOL in United States courts violates principles of 
international and maritime law.167 The argument is that the courts are 
reaching beyond their jurisdiction in permitting prosecution of ORB 
violations because these have their roots in illegal discharges that occurred 
                                                                                                                           
 160. See id. at 9 (discussing the many ways companies have dedicated increased 
resources to improve management practices for environmental compliance). 
 161. See id. (explaining how some companies have decided to “augment the DPA 
reporting system under their Safety Management System by providing open hotlines or 
anonymous electronic reporting options to crew members whereby they can alert shoreside 
management of environmental deficiencies or violations aboard a ship”). 
 162. See id. (describing the benefits of an “Open Reporting System”). 
 163. See id. (discussing the efforts of several companies instituting a monetary reward 
system). 
 164. See id. (explaining how vessel owners are on notice and have taken proactive steps 
towards compliance). 
 165. See id. (discussing the link between increased enforcement and increased efforts 
towards compliance). 
 166. See Gullo, supra note 56, at n. 16 (explaining that despite the increased 
enforcement the level of noncompliance remains high). 
 167. See United States v. Jho, 534 F.3d 398, 405 (5th Cir. 2008) (arguing that 
prosecuting a violation would violate the principles of international law); see United States 
v. Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1362 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (arguing that the 
prosecution is inconsistent with the principles of MARPOL and the Law of the Sea 
Convention of 1982 and would therefore upset the international legal regime). 
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outside of United States jurisdiction.168 These arguments ignore the limited 
nature and specific crimes that the United States successfully prosecutes. 
The principles of comity and the law of the flag doctrine involve 
the respect that nations provide to each other when enforcing laws against 
citizens of other states.169 Comity is traditionally defined as “the recognition 
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or 
judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty 
and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons 
who are under the protection of its laws.”170 Law of the flag doctrine is 
similar to the international law principle of comity. Under the Convention 
on the High Seas, a state has jurisdiction over vessels that fly its flag, a 
principle adopted from customary international law’s treatment of ships on 
the high seas beyond any sovereign’s territorial jurisdiction.171 Comity 
interacts with the law of the flag doctrine, in that a port state may, but need 
not, refrain from exercising its rightful jurisdiction over actions taken in 
port or territorial waters, yielding instead to adjudication by the flag state.172 
From this doctrine, it is clear that there is a long-standing respect for the 
laws and acts of other nations as part of traditional maritime law.173 
It has been argued that the United States’ aggressive policy of 
MARPOL enforcement violates the above traditional principles of 
international and maritime law specifically enacted in MARPOL and the 
APPS.174 If this is the case—that United States’ prosecutions are really 
prosecutions for MARPOL violations occurring on the high seas—then the 
United States is violating MARPOL, the law of the flag doctrine, and 
                                                                                                                           
 168. See Jho, 534 F.3d at 405 (reciting defendants’ argument that the United States 
surrendered its jurisdiction to prosecute violations where the prosecution is not in 
accordance with international law); see Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1362 (reciting 
defendant’s argument that a false statement concerning discharges made in Bahamian waters 
was not within the jurisdiction of the Coast Guard). 
 169. See Jho, 534 F.3d at 405–06 (defining the “law of the flag doctrine” and 
discussing sovereign exercise of jurisdiction). 
 170. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895). 
 171. See Jho, 534 F.3d at 406–08 (discussing the United Nations’ opinion on a vessels’ 
flag and a countries jurisdiction in enforcement against that country). 
 172. See id. at 405 (discussing comity in admiralty cases). 
 173. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 169–70 (discussing the right of English courts to execute 
foreign decrees in admiralty, recognized as early as 1607); see also Kathryn T. Martin, 
Comment, U.S. Control Over Extraterritorial Water Pollution: The Interplay Between 
International and Domestic Law, 22 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 209 (2008–2009) 
(discussing a number of cases illustrating “a growing tendency in U.S. Courts to respect 
international law and recognize it as a body of law that exists concurrently with U.S. law.”). 
 174. See Martin, supra note 173, at 214 (discussing the Government’s position in Ionia 
and its appearance of arguing the supremacy of U.S. law in regards to standards such as 
MARPOL). 
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traditional principles of comity.175 As Grasso and Linsin note, “none of the 
recent MARPOL enforcement cases brought in the United States have 
involved allegations of intentional pollution in U.S. waters.”176 
MARPOL’s focus and goals must be considered when addressing 
the principles of international law and comity. While it is undoubtedly 
important to respect basic principles of international law, the United States 
and the majority of major shipping nations in the world have all signed and 
ratified MARPOL based on a belief that the pollution of our oceans is a 
problem.177 Moreover, because MARPOL is not self-executing, every 
nation is required to expressly draft and pass legislation enacting the 
provisions of MARPOL.178 MARPOL requires legislation that enacts the 
provisions of the treaty within a nation’s laws and indicates that the 
signatory countries agree that the principles and goals are important and a 
worthwhile venture.179 
If the United States is violating principles of international and 
maritime law, it may be necessary to increase the legitimacy of MARPOL 
internationally and convince the other signatory nations that they ought to 
do the same. Yet, because the world’s oceans must be protected, if other 
MARPOL nations refuse or are unable to enforce MARPOL adequately, 
then the United States must be the lone crusader acting to protect this 
precious resource by whatever means necessary.180 If that requires 
prosecutions of actual discharges on the high seas or extending the APPS to 
include all discharges that occur within the United States economic zone, 
then that is what the United States ought to do. 
This argument—that the United States is distorting and violating 
traditional principles of international and maritime law—also ignores the 
                                                                                                                           
 175. See generally United States v. Ionia Mgmt., 555 F.3d 303 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(discussing the interaction of MARPOL and domestic law); United States v. Jho, 534 F.3d 
398 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Petraia Maritime, Ltd., 483 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D. Me. 
2007) (discussing the distinction between extraterritorial and jurisdictional violations); 
United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (S.D. Fla. 1998) 
(discussing the interaction of MARPOL and domestic law). 
 176. Grasso & Linsin, supra note 139, at 10. 
 177. See MARPOL 73/78, supra note 22, at 547 (“The Parties . . . Recogniz[e] also the 
need to improve further the prevention and control of marine pollution from ships, 
particularly oil tankers . . . .”). 
 178. See generally, Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (discussing the 
definition of a self-executing treaty). 
 179. See id. (discussing the requirements for a non-self-executing treaty to become 
binding). 
 180. See generally COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE GLOBAL OCEANS REGIME 
(June 19, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/oceans/global-oceans-regime/p21035# (suggesting 
several ways the United States could improve Ocean pollution, and the discussing the 
successes of MARPOL enforcement) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
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limited scope of the prosecutions brought against chief engineers and ship 
owners.181 Both prosecutors and courts are careful to prosecute and punish 
only MARPOL violations that actually occur in United States territorial 
waters.182 Of the five cases discussed earlier, none of the crimes alleged or 
charged were for the illegal discharge of oil or oily mixture, but rather only 
for the failure to have a properly maintained ORB while in United States 
territorial waters.183 As noted earlier in Jho, ship owners and chief 
engineers have an affirmative duty when in the United States territorial 
waters to have a properly maintained ORB.184 
Moreover, in Royal Caribbean, the court noted that if Royal 
Caribbean had properly recorded the improper discharge, no criminal 
prosecution would continue, at least in the United States.185 The 
enforcement of MARPOL ORB violations in the United States can have a 
positive impact on both ocean pollution186 and the legitimacy of MARPOL 
as a large multi-national treaty without violating the law of the flag doctrine 
or principles of international law.187 If Royal Caribbean had recorded the 
illegal action, it would have been far more difficult for their flag state, 
Liberia, to ignore the violation.188  
                                                                                                                           
 181. See generally Jho, 534 F.3d 398 (charging chief engineer with records violation 
and false statements in port); Petraia, 483 F. Supp. 2d 34 (charging company with records 
violation and false statements in port); Ionia, 555 F.3d 303 (same); United States v. Pena, 
684 F.3d 1137 (11th Cir. 2012) (charging the compliance surveyor with conspiring to violate 
records, failing to make required inspection, and false statements to Coast Guard officials); 
Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (charging Royal Caribbean with records violation in 
port). 
 182. See Berg, supra note 6, at 257 (discussing United States jurisdiction over foreign-
flagged vessels) 
 183. See generally Jho, 534 F.3d 398 (determining that the United States is able to 
prosecute a failure to maintain an accurate oil record book); Petraia, 483 F. Supp. 2d 34 
(same); Ionia, 555 F.3d 303 (same); Pena, 684 F.3d 1137 (same); Royal Caribbean, 11 F. 
Supp. 2d 1358 (same). 
 184. See Jho, 534 F.3d at 403 (describing the duty upon foreign-flagged vessels to 
ensure that its oil record book is accurate upon entering the ports of navigable waters of the 
United States). 
 185. See Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d. at 1371 (“[W]ere the Oil Record Book 
accurate, in that it reflected any and all alleged illegal oil discharges, there would be no 
possible §1001 prosecution in this action.”). 
 186. See COST SAVINGS, supra note 5, at 52 (noting that stringent enforcement, 
inspection, and surveillance can be deployed simultaneously to effectively deter polluters); 
see also Kehoe, supra note 2, at 3–4 (discussing the utility of federal sentencing guidelines 
for imposing jail time on offenders who, absent U.S. prosecution, would be overlooked by 
the “flags of convenience” states). 
 187. See Martin, supra note 173, at 217–18 (noting that stronger enforcement efforts, in 
which vital U.S. ports are a key part, fortifies the international legal regime). 
 188. See Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1361–62 (“Liberia filed its determination 
that there was reasonable doubt that the Nordic Empress was in contravention of MARPOL 
 
TO COMPLY OR NOT TO COMPLY? 277 
 
 
By increasing the risk of prosecution for failure to have a properly 
maintained ORB, and thereby enhancing the incentives for compliance with 
MARPOL’s records requirements, the United States will be able to refer 
cases to flag states with evidence that the flag state will be hard pressed not 
to prosecute.189 With the potential for international backlash and shaming 
from a failure to prosecute clear MARPOL violations by flag states, these 
flag states of convenience will no longer be able to ignore the harm that the 
shipping industry is doing to the oceans, which they aid and abet through 
non-enforcement.190 In order for this to be successful, the United States and 
other nations that collect evidence of MARPOL violations will have to 
actively publicize this information in order to hold the refusing state 
accountable in the eyes of the world. 191 This means that the United States 
and other countries have the opportunity to help instigate MARPOL 
prosecutions by other signatory nations by enforcing compliance with the 
narrow ORB maintenance requirement.192 
The United States policy of strict MARPOL enforcement is not a 
violation of principles of extra-territorial enforcement because the treaty 
and statute specifically address non-domestic conduct, making it 
enforceable under its own terms.193 As Schoenbaum notes, “A criminal 
statute may have extra-territorial effect if it is not limited to domestic 
conduct by its terms and if legislative intent of extraterritorial application 
can be inferred from its policy or legislative history.”194 MARPOL/APPS 
limits prosecutorial jurisdiction over illegal discharges to those committed 
                                                                                                                           
and that it was ‘difficult’ to respond to the allegations of ‘improperly recorded’ Oil Record 
Book entries under the facts as presented . . . .”). 
 189. See id. at 1361–62, 1371 (noting that the U.S. prosecution was pursued only after 
Liberia found favorably for Royal Caribbean, but that U.S. prosecution would have been 
groundless if the ORB reflected the unlawful discharge). 
 190. See Sandeep Gopalan, Alternative Sanctions and Social Norms in International 
Law: The Case of Abu Ghraib, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 785, 786 (2007) (arguing that 
shaming can be a powerful tool “to influence the offending state to take corrective action 
and fill the enforcement gap in international law”). 
 191. See id. at 820 (describing the success that Amnesty International has had through 
collection and exposure of international law violations, and moral appeals to pressure 
compliance). 
 192. See id. at 813–15 (explaining that international agreement and compliance with a 
social norm encourages other countries to comply in order to signal “respect for the rule of 
law,” with an eye to future cooperative interactions); see also Martin, supra note 173, at 
217–18 (noting that the international MARPOL regime would be strengthened by 
multinational extraterritorial enforcement). 
 193. See Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1364 (“[T]he extraterritoriality doctrine 
providing jurisdiction over certain extraterritorial offenses whose ‘extraterritorial acts are 
intended to have an effect within the sovereign territory’ seems applicable to this case.”). 
 194. 1 SCHOENBAUM, supra note 8, at 152–53 (citing United States v. Williams, 617 
F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980)) (emphasizing the importance of legislative intent when 
determining whether a statute has extraterritorial effect). 
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in a nation’s territorial waters or by ships of its flag,195 but the United States 
prosecutions at issue in these cases are not inconsistent with this 
jurisdictional requirement.196 The actions that are prosecuted are violations 
of domestic law occurring within the United States, and insofar as these 
crimes entail violations of MARPOL, there is no requirement that these 
prosecutions or cases be referred to flag states as this decision is left to the 
discretion of the nation where the violation occurred.197 Therefore, even if 
the MARPOL prosecutions at issue were extra-territorial, the United States 
is justified in continuing to prosecute them.198 
The argument that the United States is violating UNCLOS when 
prosecuting ORB violations ignores that the United States, as a sovereign 
nation, has the right to enforce its own laws within its own jurisdiction,199 
even though parts of UNCLOS overlap with United States common law as 
customary international law.200 In Royal Caribbean, even though the root 
                                                                                                                           
 195. See 33 U.S.C. § 1902(a)(2) (“This chapter shall apply . . . with respect to Annexes 
I and II to the Convention, to a ship, other than a ship referred to in paragraph (1), while in 
the navigable waters of the United States.”). 
 196. See United States v. Jho, 534 F.3d 398, 398 (5th Cir. 2008) (alleging that Jho gave 
false testimony to the U.S. Coast guard and knowingly failed to maintain an oil record 
book); see also United States v. Petraia Maritime, Ltd., 483 F. Supp. 2d 34, 39 (D. Me. 
2007) (holding that the United States had jurisdiction to bring charges for having an 
inaccurate ORB while in the United States’ navigable waters); United States v. Ionia Mgmt. 
S.A., 555 F.3d 303, 308 (2d Cir. 2009) (joining the Fifth Circuit and holding that the APPS 
imposes a duty on ships to have an accurately maintained ORB when entering a U.S. port); 
United States v. Pena, 684 F.3d 1137, 1146 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wilson v. Girard, 354 
U.S. 524, 529 (1957) (per curiam)) (“[T]he United States ‘has exclusive jurisdiction to 
punish offenses against its law committed within its borders, unless it expressly or impliedly 
consents to surrender its jurisdiction.’”); Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1364 (holding 
that whether the United States has the authority to regulate potentially illegal discharges or 
failure to properly update an oil record book outside of United States jurisdiction does not 
affect the United States Coast Guard’s ability to police the maintenance of an oil record 
book inside U.S. waters). 
 197. See MARPOL 73, Art. IV(2) (stating that when there occurs “[a]ny violation . . . 
within the jurisdiction” of a state party, that state must “[c]ause proceedings to be taken in 
accordance with its law” if it does not turn evidence over to the flag state); 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1908(f) (stating that where a ship sails under the flag of a foreign MARPOL signatory, 
“the Secretary . . . may refer the matter to the government of the country of the ship’s 
registry or nationality”) (emphasis added). 
 198. See Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1364 (“[T]he extraterritoriality doctrine 
providing jurisdiction over certain extraterritorial offenses whose ‘extraterritorial acts are 
intended to have an effect within the sovereign territory’ seems applicable to this case.” 
(quoting U.S. v. Padilla-Martinez, 762 F.2d 942 (11th Cir. 1985))). 
 199. See id. at 1368 (noting that the federal government’s ability to enforce MARPOL-
violating discharges in international waters “does not bear upon our inquiry as to whether the 
United States has jurisdiction to enforce its [domestic] laws in port in Miami, Florida”). 
 200. See 1 SCHOENBAUM, supra note 8, at 24 (“With respect to the traditional uses of 
the sea, therefore, the United States accepts the [Law of the Seas] Convention as customary 
international law, binding upon the United States.”).  
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cause of the crime was an illegal discharge under MARPOL, Royal 
Caribbean was prosecuted for violations of the False Claims Act, a United 
States law.201 No nation can be obligated to not enforce its own laws within 
its own territorial limits against foreign individuals.202 Therefore, the 
enforcement of ORB requirements is merely the United States applying the 
laws of the United States against those who choose to avail themselves of 
the United States territory and the United States ports.203 
 
IV. What is the Correct Path Forward? 
A. Practical Considerations and Realities of Large Multi-National Treaties 
 
Because large portions of the oceans are not part of any sovereign 
nation and because of the necessity of ocean travel, a multi-national treaty 
addressing the ocean oil pollution is necessary.204 And as noted before, 
without strict enforcement by all signatories, the treaty loses legitimacy and 
power to accomplish its goal.205 In the case of MARPOL, the world is 
interested in protecting one of the largest, if not the largest, natural 
resources on the planet.206 
The most effective solution to the problem of effective enforcement 
of MARPOL is to create an international court that is the sole adjudicative 
body for MARPOL violations.207 An international MARPOL court would 
                                                                                                                           
 201. See Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1369 (“[C]ustomary international law 
principles, which can be binding as a component of domestic law, require this Court to 
consider UNCLOS as setting forth binding principles of international law.”). 
 202. See id. at 1364 (“Under MARPOL . . . the United States . . . has the duty and the 
obligation to board and inspect ships while in port and to pursue appropriate measures to 
address any violations thereof.”); see also Amanda M. Caprari, Lovable Pirates? The Legal 
Implications of the Battle Between Environmentalists and Whalers in the Southern Ocean, 
42 Conn. L. Rev. 1493, 1513 (July 2010) (discussing the undeniable duty to enforce national 
anti-piracy laws but not legal duty to enforce UNCLOS anti-piracy laws outside of a nations 
territorial waters). 
 203. See id. (discussing the application of the extraterritoriality doctrine). 
 204. See 1 SCHOENBAUM, supra note 8, at 22 (explaining the unique nature of the law of 
the seas as customary international law and the need for an enforcement mechanism); see 
also DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 3–7 (listing the international conventions 
that govern the law of the sea). 
 205. See William Burke-White, Dean and Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania 
Law School, Transnational Law Institute Lecture Series (Jan. 31, 2013) available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pMpCrZdsfag (arguing that treaties require strict 
adherence by parties in order for them to bear meaning). 
 206. See MARPOL 78 supra note 22, at 546 (describing the need to protect 
international oceans from pollution). 
 207. See Rebecca Becker, MARPOL 73/78: An Overview in International 
Environmental Enforcement, 10 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 625, 638 (1998) (describing the 
need for solutions to MARPOL enforcement). 
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have original jurisdiction for violations of all of the MARPOL Annexes and 
avoid the difficulties of extra-territorial enforcement, traditional 
international and maritime law principles, and comity from becoming a 
barrier to enforcement in the United States or other courts.208 
While an international MARPOL court as the exclusive forum for 
MARPOL violations would be the most effective and efficient solution to 
the problem of MARPOL legitimacy and actual enforcement power 
associated with MARPOL,209 it would be unlikely to garner the support of 
United States. The United States is unlikely to ratify and sign any 
amendments to MARPOL that would attempt to remove jurisdiction from 
its courts.210  
The United States has traditionally been skeptical of international 
treaties and even more skeptical of treaties that involve international courts 
that could subject the country or its citizens to jurisdiction and possible 
prosecution.211 Any proposal for an International MARPOL court would 
not subject the United States as a sovereign nation to jurisdiction in this 
court. It will still be difficult, however, to convince the United States 
Congress to join an international MARPOL court, which would have 
jurisdiction over U.S. citizens and corporations for environmental crimes 
committed on the high seas, even if all concerns of due process are 
answered in the court’s charter.212  
Because an international MARPOL court is not practical, a 
different solution is needed to deal with MARPOL violations. Any solution 
will have to focus on increasing compliance by ships in their daily 




                                                                                                                           
 208. See id. (stressing the importance of improved intergovernmental enforcement in 
enforcement of MARPOL). 
 209. See id. (noting that this option circumvents the problem of voluntary compliance). 
 210. See United States v. Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1364 (2006) 
(describing the United States’ duty to enforce the compliance of laws in its sovereign 
territory). 
 211. See e.g., Leila Nadya Sadat, The Nurembourg Paradox, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 151 
(Winter 2010) (discussing and comparing the reasons for the French adoption of the 
International Criminal Court Treaty with the United States’ failure to adopt and join the 
International Criminal Court).  
 212. See Becker, supra note 207, at 638–39 (noting that an international tribunal 
“would only be effective upon the consent of MARPOL nations,” which likely prize 
sovereignty too much to make such a tribunal politically feasible). 
 213. See id. at 641–42 (stressing the importance of publicity, education, and directives 
on ships about the need to protect the seas from illegal oil dumping). 
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B. Who is the Proper Party to Prosecute? 
 
In most of the cases discussed, the defendant is the ship owner that 
has violated provisions of MARPOL.214 These ship owners have the deepest 
pockets and the ability to pay high settlements or damages as well as front 
potentially expensive litigation costs.215 Some have suggested, however, 
that the prosecution of ship owners unfairly prejudices a company or 
individual for the acts of the crew and often the chief engineer.216 
Therefore, they argue that prosecutions should focus on the chief engineer 
or the specific individuals responsible for the illegal discharge or ORB 
violation.217 
In addition to Linsin’s proposal to focus prosecutions on chief 
engineers instead of ship owners, Kehoe has argued that the United States 
Courts should use the illegal discharges from outside the United States 
jurisdiction when sentencing those liable for MARPOL violations within 
United States jurisdictions.218 He argues that this will increase the deterrent 
effect.219 Increased punishment that may be applied for an ORB violation 
will reduce the incentive for chief engineers to try to cut costs by illegal 
discharges regardless of any explicit company policy to abide by all 
provisions and requirements of MARPOL.220 
                                                                                                                           
 214. Compare Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1358 (prosecuting only corporate 
ship-owner for crewmember malfeasance) with United States v. Jho, 534 F.3d 398, 398 (5th 
Cir. 2008) (prosecuting corporate ship-owner and chief engineer for engineer’s 
malfeasance). 
 215. See Craig H. Allen, Proving Corporate Criminal Liability for Negligence in Vessel 
Management and Operations: An Allision-Oil Spill Case Study, 10 LOY. MAR. L.J. 269, 270 
(2010) (noting that corporate fines are often dismissed as an inconsequential penalty because 
of their small size compared to the scope of a company’s business). 
 216. See Grasso & Linsin, supra note 139, at 10–11 (noting that companies can be held 
accountable for the actions of rogue employees simply because of mere inattention).  
 217. See Grasso & Linsin, supra note 139, at 8 (arguing that the focus on companies 
resulting from whistleblower charges distorts incentives and causes internal compliance 
systems to atrophy); Cf. Justice Rakoff, A Conversation with Judge Rakoff (Mar. 1, 2013) 
(on file with WASHINGTON & LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT) 
(suggesting that for securities law violations, it is not the company that committed the crime 
but the individual, so holding individuals liable for violations will have a stronger deterrent 
effect).  
 218. See Kehoe, supra note 2, at 25 (arguing that the extraterritorial oil dumping was a 
predicate fact to prosecution of the ORB offense, thus constituting offense conduct justifying 
heightened penalties under the Sentencing Guidelines).  
 219. See id. at 40–42 (arguing that United States v. Abrogar undermined “the 
significant deterrent effect that the risk of jail time can have on engineers who violate 
MARPOL and APPS” and that such imprisonment is fair given engineers’ knowledge of the 
risks of noncompliance). 
 220. See id. at 40–41 (arguing that engineers make a variety of choices, including one 
to falsify record books, for which independent punishment is an appropriate deterrent). 
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Linsin, Grasso, and Kehoe all make valid points. If a ship owner or 
charterer has a strict policy regarding compliance with MARPOL but the 
ship’s engineer acts independently, holding the owner or the charterer liable 
for refusal to comply with MARPOL or mere willful ignorance of the 
actions of their engineering crew is problematic.221 Additionally, there is a 
strong argument that if stopping MARPOL violations is the goal and 
stricter enforcement is the means by which that is best accomplished, then 
harsher sentencing for willful violations of MARPOL may be a legitimate 
sanction.222 
The argument that the chief engineer ought to be held ultimately 
liable, however, does not account for actual facts in many, if not most, 
cases.223 Chief engineers are under constant pressure to reduce costs from 
the ship owner or the charter party and while the costs of compliance with 
MARPOL are very low, this pressure to reduce costs will force an engineer 
to find savings in any form available.224 
Chief engineers are also in a particularly vulnerable position. 
George Chalos of Chalos & Co. discusses the case of Ioannis Mylonakis, a 
chief engineer aboard the M/T Georgios.225 Mylonakis was prosecuted 
along with the ship owners for MARPOL violations; however, unlike the 
                                                                                                                           
 221. See id. at 41 (arguing that penalizing charterers for the actions of the chief 
engineer or vessel crew is not an effective deterrent); see also Grasso & Linsin, supra note 
139, at 10 (arguing for more efficient prosecutorial procedures in order to hold the most 
culpable people responsible for MARPOL violations). 
 222. See Kehoe, supra note 2, at 42 (“[T]here are statutes in addition to APPS with 
Guideline provisions that can be used to authorize jail time sentences against chief engineers 
and other supervisory crew members who pollute the world’s oceans with oily wastes.”). 
 223. See COST SAVINGS, supra note 5, at 4 (“Savings derived by not complying with the 
IMO’s regulations leads to lower operating costs that can be used to derive an unfair 
advantage in the notoriously competitive ship charter market.”) 
 224. See Kehoe, supra note 2, at 41–42 (describing the economic pressures facing chief 
engineers from corporate ship-owners); Andrew W. Homer, Red Sky at Morning: The 
Horizon for Corporations, Crew Members, and Corporate Officers as the United States 
Continues to Aggressive Criminal Prosecution of Intentional Pollution from Ships, 32 TUL. 
MAR. L.J. 149, 167 (Winter 2007) (describing the pressures and responsibilities of the master 
and chief engineer on ships). 
 225. See Chalos & Co. P.C., Wrongly Accused Chief Engineer Takes Intentional 
Polluters to Task, CHALOS & CO., P.C. (2012) [hereinafter Chalos 2012], available at 
http://www.chaloslaw.com/wrongly-accused-chief-engineer.html (describing a lawsuit filed 
by a chief engineer accused and acquitted of MARPOL charges) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); see also 
Bob Rust, Chief Engineer Sues Owner, TRADEWINDS (Aug. 25, 2012), available at 
http://www.chaloslaw.com/pdf/tradewinds-mylonakis-article.pdf (detailing Mylonakis’s 
claim that his employer for allegedly scapegoated him for the company’s wrongdoing) (on 
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
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ship owners, Mylonakis was acquitted.226 Mylonakis sued the ship owner, 
Styga, for malicious prosecution.227 Mylonakis alleged that Styga supplied 
false information to the government in their plea agreement that led to his 
indictment.228 On December 4, 2012, the District Court for the Southern 
District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of Styga on 
Mylonakis’ malicious prosecution claim.229 This case displays the distinct 
position of vulnerability that a chief engineer faces when both the ship 
owner and the chief engineer are prosecuted for MARPOL violations.230 A 
chief engineer is susceptible to prison sentences, unlike the corporate ship 
owner,231 and the chief engineer is unlikely to have the same representation 
that the ship owner does in order to defend their interests.232 
Chief engineers are under enormous pressure from the ship owners 
to keep daily operation costs down and are particularly vulnerable when 
MARPOL violations are prosecuted.233 The ultimate responsibility in 
maritime shipping situations ought to rest on the person or entity that has 
ultimate authority.  
Due to low enforcement and low penalties for violations there are 
currently few incentives for compliance with MARPOL.234 One solution to 
increase MARPOL compliance would be to not only find the company 
                                                                                                                           
 226. See Mylonakis v. M/T Georgios, 909 F. Supp. 2d 691, 703 (S.D. Tex. 2012) 
(noting that Mylonakis was acquitted, whereas the ship’s owners entered into a guilty plea 
agreement). 
 227. See id. at 699 (describing Mylonakis’s claims against Styga, including the claim 
for malicious prosecution). 
 228. See id. at 702–03 (describing the events that lead to Mylonakis’ indictment). 
 229. See id. at 740–41 (ruling that Maylonakis had raised no genuine issues of material 
fact to support a malicious prosecution claim). 
 230. See Chalos 2012, supra note 225 (describing the position of the company and the 
engineer relative to the lawsuit). 
 231. See Kehoe, supra note 2, at 31–39 (identifying the statutes that allow prosecution 
of individuals for MARPOL violations); see Rakoff, supra note 216 and accompanying text 
(discussing penalties against the individuals engaging in criminal action). 
 232. See Giuseppe Bottiglieri Shipping Co. S.P.A. v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 2d 
1241, 1244–46 (S.D. Ala. 2012) (noting that while the corporate ship owner haggled with 
the Coast Guard over terms for the ship’s release from port, the chief engineer was charged 
with making false statements). 
 233. See COST SAVINGS, supra note 5, at 4 (explaining ship company’s motivations to 
fail to comply with dumping regulations in order to save money); see Chalos 2012, supra 
note 225 (explaining a chief engineer’s lawsuit after being falsely accused of oil dumping for 
which his employer was responsible). 
 234. See Jane Korineck & Patricia Sourdin, Clarifying Trade Costs: Maritime 
Transport and Its Effect on Agricultural Trade, 32 APPLIED ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES AND 
POLICY 417, 417–18, NO. 3 (2010), available at 
http://aepp.oxfordjournals.org/content/32/3/417.full.pdf+html (describing the impacts trade 
costs have on shipping and motivations to cut costs in various ways) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
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liable for MARPOL violations but also find the individual owner or control 
person of the company liable on a theory similar to corporate veil piercing 
if the limited liability company was formed to defraud or if no evidence of 
fraud on an individual liability theory similar to the one in United States v. 
Park.235 By prosecuting the company as a corporation and the company 
executive as an individual there will be an added deterrent effect through 
high monetary fines against the corporation and potential prison and 
individual monetary fines against the control person.236 
It would also be useful to utilize chief engineers and ship captains 
as witnesses and sources in these prosecutions by granting immunity to any 
chief engineer or captain that provides evidence to the proper authorities 
regarding MARPOL violations.237 By utilizing chief engineers and control 
persons, prosecutors will have more access to company policies, both 
explicit and implicit.238 The number of whistleblowers available to provide 
evidence increases prosecutions.239 A focused increase in the number of 
available whistleblowers and witnesses to MARPOL violations will create a 
culture of MARPOL compliance within the industry and foster ship 
owners’ use of inter-corporate regulation in order to avoid MARPOL 
liability.240 
                                                                                                                           
 235. See Larry S. Kane, How Can We Stop Corporate Environmental Pollution?: 
Corporate Officer Liability, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 293, 303 (Fall 1991) (quoting United 
States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975)) (noting Park’s holding that “a corporate agent, through 
whose act, default, or omission the corporation committed a crime, was himself guilty 
individually of that crime”); see also Douglas S. Brooks & Thomas C. Frongillo, 
Environmental Prosecutions: Criminal Liability Without Mens Rea and Exposure Under the 
Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, 79 DEF. COUNS. J. 12, 16 (Jan. 2012) (“Thus, the 
key component of the Park decision . . . has been specifically adopted in the environmental 
law area, is the imposition of criminal liability on corporate officials who fail to prevent the 
harm at issue, regardless of their direct involvement in bringing about such harm.”). 
 236.  In order for this argument to be one hundred percent effective a change in personal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment for maritime cases is 
required. For an in depth discussion of how the courts see personal jurisdiction in maritime 
cases see generally, Steven R. Swanson, Fifth Amendment Due Process, Foreign 
Shipowners and International Law, 36 TUL. MAR. L.J. 123 (Winter 2011) (arguing that 
courts should reconsider Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to look at the nature of the 
shipping business and benefits to the owners vessel of doing business in the United States to 
show that a vessel owner or charterer has personally availed himself of doing business in the 
United States and the courts should recognize that Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due 
process standards are not necessarily the same). 
 237. See Kaine, supra note 235, at 315–16 (describing a hypothetical that illustrates the 
relationship between a corporate officer and the agent executing the illegal act). 
 238. See id. (noting that agents often have access to explicit and implicit corporate 
policies). 
 239. See Grasso & Linsin, supra note 139, at 8 (describing incentives for 
whistleblowers who witness wrongdoing to report illegal oil dumping to authorities at U.S. 
ports). 
 240. See id. at 10–11 (explaining the overall goal of MARPOL compliance). 
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In addition to relying on more whistleblowers, prosecutors ought to 
increase the penalties they are seeking against the ship owners and charter 
holders.241 Kehoe has argued against this view.242 In support of his 
argument that current damage awards against companies, especially smaller 
companies, are sufficient, he cites the $4.9 million judgment awarded 
against Ionia Management.243 The evidence that the judgments have had a 
positive effect on compliance and deterrence, however shows a different 
picture. In a 2003 OECD report on MARPOL and enforcement, the OECD 
argues specifically that even though the cost of compliance with MARPOL 
is only two percent of daily operational costs and in the United States the 
penalties awarded have been significant, compliance has not significantly 
increased because the risk of being caught combined with the cost of a 
successful prosecution still does not outweigh the cost savings of non-
compliance.244 
Increasing the possible financial penalty against a corporation will 
also increase the award a whistleblower may be eligible to receive.245 
Therefore, detection of violations by the proper authorities and deterrence 
from non-compliance with MARPOL will both be increased at the same 
time.246 
The maritime industry may contend that an increase in the size of 
penalties for MARPOL violations will both negatively impact the global 
maritime industry and directly injure the United States maritime industry, 
particularly major port cities.247 Yet, compliance with MARPOL is a 
relatively low percentage of daily operational costs.248 Even though the 
compliance costs are low, “the level of noncompliance with MARPOL 
                                                                                                                           
 241. See COST SAVINGS, supra note 5, at 4 (outlining the financial benefits charter 
holders receive by ignoring MARPOL violations that go unpunished). 
 242. See Kehoe, supra note 2, at 41 (noting that “the level of noncompliance with 
MARPOL remains unacceptably high” notwithstanding the already stiff penalties sought by 
the Justice Department in MARPOL prosecutions). 
 243. See id. at 41 (“[A]fter a jury conviction and a court imposed fine of $4.9 million 
dollars in the Ionia case, the court prohibited the defendant’s vessels from returning to U.S. 
ports until the corporate operator had installed certain pollution prevention equipment on 
board all of its vessels.”). 
 244. See COST SAVINGS, supra note 5, at 44, 49–50 (comparing the operating costs to 
fines and other costs associated with noncompliance). 
 245. See 33 U.S.C. § 1908(a) (allowing courts to award whistleblowers up to half the 
nominal value of a MARPOL fine). 
 246. See Rutzel, supra note 150, at 35 (indicating that further punishment increases 
compliance through individual and general deterrence). 
 247. See id. at 36 (discussing the negative impacts that whistleblowing may have on a 
corporation financially). 
 248. See COST SAVINGS, supra note 5, at 44 (“Environmental compliance costs 
represent approximately 1–2% of the total fixed costs (capital and operating costs) of the 
respective vessels chosen in this simulation.”). 
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remains unacceptably high, especially among operators of general cargo 
vessels that tend to have tighter operating budgets and earn low freight 
rates, leading to a greater temptation to cut all costs that do not directly 
endanger navigation.”249 A two percent daily operating cost increase is 
unlikely to derail and injure the maritime shipping industry.250 Moreover, 
the United States economy is one of the largest in the world,251 and will not 
see an end to the transatlantic shipping into its ports due to increased 
enforcement and penalties for MARPOL violations when the cost of 
compliance is only a minimal increase in daily operational costs.252 
If the goal of MARPOL violation penalties is to deter discharges of 
oil and other waste into the oceans,253 then the penalties must necessarily 
have that effect. When the risk of prosecution and the cost of violation are 
low, there is no deterrent effect. 254 In order for deterrence to work, the risk 
of prosecution and the cost of the penalty must both be prohibitively 
high.255 Otherwise companies will continue to focus on their balance sheets 
and look to save that two percent a day.256 As the OECD report indicates, 
the cost of compliance is negligible, yet, compliance is still a problem.257 
This increase in penalties must cause the maritime shipping industry to ask, 
“to comply or not comply?” 
 
C. The Whistleblower’s Role in Increasing United States Enforcement 
 
To increase effective enforcement of MARPOL in the United 
States an increase in detection through increased use and possibly change of 
                                                                                                                           
 249. Kehoe, supra note 2, at 41. 
 250. See COST SAVINGS, supra note 5, at 44 (describing the minimal impact of overall 
environmental cost compliance). 
 251. See Central Intelligence Agency, Country Comparison: Stock of Foreign Direct 
Investment – At Home, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2198rank.html 
(listing the number of investments made domestically by citizens of other countries, which 
can be used to determine the size of the international market directed towards the home 
country) (last visited Nov. 22, 2013) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 252. See COST SAVINGS, supra note 5, at 44 (showing daily compliance costs as a 
proportion of operating costs). 
 253. See MARPOL 73/78, supra note 26, at 62 (“Recognizing also the need to improve 
further the prevention and control of marine pollution from ships, particularly oil 
tankers . . . .”). 
 254. See COST SAVINGS, supra note 5, at 47 (noting that some operators believe that 
MARPOL violations are worthwhile because of the low probability of being caught). 
 255. See id. at 49 (arguing that where fines are low, operators can simply consider this 
the cost of doing business). 
 256. See id. at 45 (discussing the financial incentives for operators in tight markets). 
 257. See id. at 44 (discussing the limited impact of compliance). 
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the whistleblower award provision in the APPS is necessary.258 While 
increased use of various technological means should not be discounted, low 
flying planes with infrared detectors and unmanned drones are all expensive 
tools that require a significant investment by the United States government 
both in equipment and in man-hours.259 This is not the case for 
whistleblowers. 
The United States can increase incentives for whistleblowers by 
reducing the risks they may undertake by coming forward to the Coast 
Guard or other individuals.260 One way to reduce these risks is to change 
the whistleblower provisions in the APPS to remove the discretion that the 
courts have in criminal cases and that the Secretary of Defense or 
Administrator of the EPA has in civil cases relating to awards.261 By 
making whistleblower awards mandatory, the whistleblower will no longer 
fear coming forward, due to the possibility of losing his or her job, losing 
weeks of work while he or she is sequestered for trial proceedings, and 
losing the possibility of future employment without receiving compensation 
for the risks they have undertaken.262 All of these events may still happen, 
but a significant whistleblower award as provided for in APPS allows a 
potential whistleblower to take these risks without necessarily affecting his 
or her ability to provide for him or herself and his or her family. 
Increasing the use of the whistleblowers as part of an enforcement 
strategy is the best approach for a variety of reasons. While external 
monitoring through airplanes or drones may yield good results, it is not as 
economically efficient or feasible as rewarding those with inside knowledge 
                                                                                                                           
 258. Jeanne Grasso & Gregory Linsin, Furthering Compliance or Compromising 
Compliance Programs? Whistleblower Rewards, 73 MAR. REP. 18, 20 [hereinafter Grasso & 
Linsin, Furthering Compliance] (June 2011), available at 
http://www.marinelink.com/magazines/archive.aspx?MID=3 (“By implementing the 
enhanced compliance and verification measures discussed above, companies may be able to 
avoid becoming the government’s—and the whistleblower’s—next target.”) (last visited 
Nov. 23, 2013) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 259. See Kehoe, supra note 2, at 7 (indicating that Coast Guard cutters and airplanes 
equipped with forward looking infrared radar are effective means of patrolling the coast line 
at night). 
 260. See Jenny Lee, Note, Corporate Corruption & The New Gold Mine, 77 BROOK. L. 
REV. 303, 317 (Fall 2011) (“Due to its inherent risks, whistleblowing, to some extent, should 
be incentivized through regulatory policies that ‘encourage individuals to break the code of 
silence in corrupt organizations.’”). 
 261. See 33 U.S.C. § 1908(a) (“In the discretion of the court, an amount equal to not 
more than ½ of such fine may be paid to the person giving information leading to 
conviction.”). 
 262. See Anderson v. United States, 2012 WL 6087283, *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2012) 
(dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, leaving the plaintiff, a 
whistleblower, without any sort of compensation despite the risks he had taken). 
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of the inner workings of the ship on a day-to-day basis.263 Additionally, 
potential witnesses and whistleblowers are on every ship, whereas it would 
be nearly impossible for any other detection method, without significant 
costs both in equipment and man power on a day to day basis, to cover the 
entire territorial waters of the United States and every ship therein.264 
The Coast Guards ability to detect violations of MARPOL expands 
with increased penalties, increased whistleblower awards, and with a 
corresponding increase in guarantees that whistleblowers will receive an 
award.265 These policies will raise the risk and the cost of non-compliance, 
creating an environment where compliance is no longer a question.266 
 
D. Arguments in Favor of Extra-Territorial Enforcement 
 
Prosecutors should be allowed to pursue prosecutions for violations 
that occur outside the United States territorial waters. While it has been the 
case that the law of the flag doctrine has limited prosecution efforts to ORB 
violations, the United States is not necessarily bound to the law of the flag 
in every situation.267 
The law of the flag is not an absolute rule, but rather a conditional 
rule.268 The law of the flag doctrine may be ignored if public policy 
outweighs the competing policy governing the law of the flag or if a foreign 
registration and incorporation of a ship and its owner are a mere façade to 
                                                                                                                           
 263. See Rutzel, supra note 150, at 34 (“Whistleblowing leads to increased compliance, 
either voluntary or enforced, without demanding additional public funds for supervision, 
detection, and evidence gathering.”). 
 264. See Gullo, supra note 56, at 144 (“APPS’s whistle-blower provision provides DOJ 
with a cooperating witness (albeit a witness with a monetary incentive to testify) that it can 
use as either pretrial leverage or as live testimony at trial.”); see also Chalos & Parker, supra 
note 6, at 232 (“However, the government’s most effective ‘secret weapon’ in the war 
against MARPOL violations is the use of ‘whistleblowers,’ most of whom are current or 
former crewmembers.”). 
 265. See Grasso & Linsin, Furthering Compliance, supra note 258, at 18 (stating that 
open reporting systems to anonymously disclose violations are among the most effective 
means of detecting MARPOL violations). 
 266. See Grasso & Linsin, supra note 139, at 8 (“[P]rosecutions [of MARPOL 
violations] are now yielding higher penalties, jail time and the banning of ships from United 
States ports.”). 
 267. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 8, at 75 (“Accordingly, Story declared that the 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States is not limited either by the 
restraining statutes or the judicial prohibitions of England . . . .”). 
 268. See id. (stating that admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is dependent on several 
factors). 
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avoid the laws of a specific nation.269 In these situations the substantive law 
of the United States may be applied.270 
The important policy goals of MARPOL, the protection of our 
oceans, weigh heavily in favor of extra-territorial enforcement.271 Therefore 
courts should allow prosecutions for any discharges that occur on the high 
seas or for actual discharges that occur and are not properly recorded in an 
ORB. 
The United States should not seek to immediately prosecute 
MARPOL violations that occur outside of the United States’ territorial 
waters. In order to foster international cooperation and international 
relations, it is good policy to initially abide by the MARPOL referral 
provision, where cases are referred to the flag state initially.272 If a flag 
state, such as Liberia or the Bahamas, refuses or fails to prosecute 
violations of MARPOL and the Coast Guard or Department of Justice have 
provided clear evidence that a violation has occurred, then public policy in 
favor of protecting our oceans outweighs any concerns of comity and 
international law.273 Without the enforcement of MARPOL and legitimate 
penalties for failure to abide by MARPOL,274 the policy that our oceans 
deserve protection and the treaty seeking to provide that protection lose all 
meaning.275 
Moreover, when the Department of Justice has been given a case, it 
should be on the lookout for incorporation and registration that is a mere 
façade.276 If all indications are that the corporation is a shell, then the 
                                                                                                                           
 269. See id. at 264 (listing a variety of factors that go into conflicts and choice of laws, 
including the place of the wrongful act, the domicile of the injured, the allegiance of the ship 
owner, the place where the contract of employment was made, forum non conveniens, etc.). 
 270. See Southern Cross S.S. Co. v. Firipis, 285 F.2d 651, 653 (4th Cir. 1960) 
(“However, if the law of the flag is to control, the flag must not be one of convenience 
merely but bona fide.”); see also 2 AM. JUR. 2D Admiralty § 105 (2013) (“The law of the flag 
may also be disregarded when foreign registration and incorporation are a mere façade to 
avoid the consequences of U.S. shipping laws.”). 
 271. See MARPOL 78, supra note 22, at 62 (stating the policy goals of MARPOL, 
which include the protection of the ocean through enforcement and regulatory means). 
 272. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COAST GUARD: ENFORCEMENT 
UNDER MARPOL V CONVENTION ON POLLUTION EXPANDED, ALTHOUGH PROBLEMS REMAIN 
19 (1995) (discussing federal policy on flag state referral). 
 273. See 2 AM. JUR. 2D Admiralty § 105 (“However, the law of the flag is not absolutely 
controlling, and will not be applied where considerations against its application outweigh 
those in its favor, as in the instance where public policy dictates that the law of the forum be 
applied.”). 
 274. See generally COST SAVINGS, supra note 5 (discussing the role of legal penalties 
vis-à-vis the economics of the shipping industry). 
 275. See Burke-White, supra note 205 (noting that treaties become meaningless without 
the deference of, or enforcement by, signatory parties). 
 276. See Southern Cross S.S. Co. v. Firipis, 285 F.2d 651, 653 (“However, if the law of 
the flag is to control, the flag must not be one of convenience merely but bona fide.”); see 
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United States should seek to prosecute and gain jurisdiction as the flag state 
when possible.277 
Through novel legal arguments278 and expanding jurisdiction for 
MARPOL prosecutions,279 the Department of Justice will be able to enforce 
MARPOL more broadly and successfully prosecute more than mere ORB 
violations. Therefore, the policy goals behind MARPOL, to reduce the 
pollution and damage to our oceans, will be furthered.280 
 
E. Increasing MARPOL’s Legitimacy as a Multi-National Treaty 
 
Professor William Burke-White from the University of 
Pennsylvania School of Law argues that a major impediment to the 
legitimacy of large multinational treaties is the failure of enforcement by 
signatory nations.281 MARPOL is subject to this problem.282 Therefore, the 
legitimacy of MARPOL as a multinational treaty is in question.283 
The United States can increase the legitimacy of MARPOL and 
help promote consistent enforcement of MARPOL by other signatories by 
continuing to aggressively prosecute MARPOL violations of U.S. flagged 
and foreign-flagged vessels that enter U.S. ports.284 The majority of ships 
that sail through the Gulf of Mexico are foreign-flagged.285 If the United 
                                                                                                                           
also 2 AM. JUR. 2D. Admiralty § 105 (“The law of the flag may also be disregarded when 
foreign registration and incorporation are a mere façade to avoid the consequences of U.S. 
shipping laws.”). 
 277. See Shaun Gehan, Note, United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.: Use of 
Federal “False Statements Act” To Extend Jurisdiction Over Polluting Incidents Into 
Territorial Seas of Foreign States, 7 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 167, 168–69 (2001) 
(“[A]pplications of domestic law are entirely consistent with the aims of the applicable 
international treaties and offer a viable means of protecting the marine environment, 
particularly when flag States themselves are hesitant to act.”). 
 278. See id. (arguing that domestic law can be applied to matters within the jurisdiction 
of another sovereign in order to effect the aims of conventional international law); see also 
Berg, supra note 6, at 277 (“Issues of international comity may be raised by the expanded 
enforcement jurisdiction.”). 
 279. See generally Berg, supra note 6 (discussing the DOJ’s efforts to expand US reach 
in MARPOL cases). 
 280. See MARPOL 78, supra note 22, at 1 (laying out the policy goals of MARPOL). 
 281. See Burke-White, supra note 205 (discussing ways to improve treaty legitimacy). 
 282. See COST SAVINGS, supra note 5, at 52 (noting that the absence of any of the 
specified enforcement factors “increases the facility with which substandard operators can 
breach international environmental regulations”). 
 283. See Burke-White, supra note 205 (discussing the importance of enforcement to 
treaty legitimacy). 
 284. See COST SAVINGS, supra note 5, at 6 (arguing that greater penalties are 
necessary). 
 285. See Brian Baker, Comment, Flags of Convenience and the Gulf Oil Spill: 
Problems and Proposed Solutions, 34 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 687, 713 n.184 (Summer 2012) 
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States prosecutes the foreign-flagged ships that have violated MARPOL, 
specifically targeting nations that have lax MARPOL enforcement, the 
world will take notice.286 This will potentially embarrass these nations that 
refuse to enforce MARPOL and lead these nations to begin devoting 
resources to MARPOL enforcement.287 
Additionally, if other nations do not increase their enforcement, the 
role of the United States with respect to ocean oil pollution may need to 
change to indicate the United States’ commitment to the protection of the 
world’s oceans and the importance of MARPOL as a multi-national 
treaty.288 
 
F. Economic Practicalities of Consistent Enforcement 
 
This Note has advocated for stricter enforcement of MARPOL by 
all MARPOL parties. This Note has not yet addressed the costs related to 
investigation and enforcement of MARPOL. Investigating and monitoring 
of the oceans for violations of MARPOL is an expensive endeavor.289 It 
requires the use and maintenance of at least a small naval fleet as well as 
the prosecutorial resources of a well-funded government attorney’s 
office.290 Many of the active flag states encourage ship owners to register 
their vessels in order to help that state’s economy.291 These flag states are 
not major economic power houses292 and do not have the resources to 
                                                                                                                           
(looking at statistics to show the impact that foreign-flagging has on the U.S. and 
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monitor the oceans, let alone have a navy of their own that would provide 
them with the tools to monitor violations of MARPOL effectively.293 
With the modern proliferation of flags-of-convenience,294 the 
ability to enforce MARPOL by flag states is becoming increasingly suspect 
because of the high costs associated and the lack of wealth and resources 
that flag states have.295 Therefore, in order to increase MARPOL 
enforcement and reduce ocean pollution a solution to the high costs of 
enforcement is necessary. One solution is to create an international fund 
that is designed to help fund flag states that are less affluent build the means 
and have the means to properly investigate and prosecute MARPOL 
violations.296 Another solution would to provide the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) with more power over enforcement within the high 
seas.297 Providing the IMO with a centralized enforcement power may 
receive similar objections to an international MARPOL court.298 If the IMO 
has a centralized prosecutorial power like INTERPOL and there is a way to 
fund the court proceedings while granting due process rights, this would be 
the ideal solution. Regardless of the solution that is adopted, a means by 
which enforcement can be easily carried out is necessary if the goals and 




The lofty goals of MARPOL and the APPS to eradicate ocean 
pollution are both admirable and necessary. Without strict enforcement of 
the entire treaty covering oil pollution, air pollution, hazardous wastes, 
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